The Consumer Debt Default Judgments Act

Consumer debt has been a difficult topic for uniform state law movements, but here's one more attempt recently approved by the Uniform Law Commission and the American Bar Association, and introduced in Colorado last week.  You can access the materials here. Meanwhile, here is ULC's summary:

Numerous studies report that default judgments are entered in more than half of all debt collection actions. The purpose of this Act is to provide consumer debtors and courts with the information necessary to evaluate debt collection actions. The Act provides consumer debtors with access to information needed to understand claims being asserted against them and identify available defenses; advises consumers of the adverse effects of failing to raise defenses or seek the voluntary settlement of claims; and makes consumers aware of assistance that may be available from legal aid organizations. The Act also seeks to provide a uniform framework in which courts can fairly, efficiently, and promptly evaluate the merits of requests for default judgments while balancing the interests of all parties and the courts.

Would welcome Credit Slips posters and readers chiming in on this act in the comments, especially if you were involved in the drafting process and/or if will be weighing in on this act with their state legislatures.

And for previous recent coverage of other uniform acts being urged on state legislatures, see here and here.

Impact of the Illinois Predatory Loan Prevention Act

In 2021 Illinois passed its Predatory Loan Prevention Act (PLPA), which imposes a 36% military APR (MAPR) cap on all loans made by non-bank or credit union or insurance company lenders. Not surprisingly, the law has not been popular with higher cost lenders who either have to change their offerings, cease doing business in Illinois, or figure out some way to team up with a bank that won't run afoul of the law's anti-evasion provision. 

Recently, opponents of the PLPA have been making some noise, pointing to a study by a trio of economists—J. Brandon Bollen, Gregory Elliehausen, and Thomas Miller—about the impact of the PLPA. (The latter two are familiar scholars whose work consistently takes a dour view of consumer finance regulations: readers might recall my debunking of another recent study by Professor Miller, co-authored with Todd Zywicki, that was fundamentally flawed because of the miscalculation of loan caps in various states.)

Using credit bureau data, the Bollen et al. paper finds that the PLPA resulted in a 30% decrease in the number of unsecured installment loans to Illinois subprime borrowers and a 37% increase in the average installment loan size to Illinois subprime borrowers, which they attribute to the difficulty in making smaller loans profitable at 36% MAPR. Additionally, based on a lender-administered survey of 699 online borrowers (not necessarily of installment loans), the Bolen paper also reports a decline in borrower financial well-being following passage of the PLPA. 

Unfortunately, the Bollen paper suffers from serious data and methodological problems such that it does not tell us anything meaningful about the wisdom of the PLPA. Here's why. 

The Financial Inclusion Trilemma

I have a new draft article up on SSRN. It's called The Financial Inclusion Trilemma. The abstract is below. 

The challenge of financial inclusion is among the most intractable policy problems in banking. Despite being the world’s wealthiest economy, many Americans are shut out of the financial system. Five percent of households lack a bank account, and an additional thirteen percent rely on expensive or predatory fringe financial services, such as check cashers or payday lenders.

Financial inclusion presents a policy trilemma. It is possible to simultaneously achieve only two of three goals: widespread availability of services to low-income consumers; fair terms of service; and profitability of service. It is possible to provide fair and profitable services, but only to a small, cherry-picked population of low-income consumers. Conversely, it is possible to provide profitable service to a large population, but only on exploitative terms. Or it is possible to provide fair services to a large population, but not at a profit.

The financial inclusion trilemma is not a market failure. Rather it is the result of the market working. The market result, however, does not accord with policy preferences. Rather than addressing that tension, American financial inclusion policy still leads with market-based solutions and soft government nudges and the vain hope that technology will somehow transform the fundamental economics of financial services for small balance deposit accounts and small dollar loans.

This Article argues that it is time to recognize the policy failure in financial inclusion and give more serious consideration to a menu of stronger regulatory interventions: hard service mandates that impose cross-subsidization among consumers; taxpayer subsidies; and public provision of financial services. In particular, this Article argues for following the approach taken in Canada, the EU, and the UK, namely the adoption of a mandate for the provision of free or low-cost basic banking services to all qualified applicants, as the simplest solution to the problem of the unbanked. Addressing small-dollar credit, however, remains an intractable problem, largely beyond the scope of financial regulation.

Hawkins & Penner--Marketing Race and Credit in America

Past Credit Slips guest blogger, Jim Hawkins from the University of Houston, and his student, Tiffany Penner, alerted me to their recent publication in the Emory Law Journal entitled, "Advertising Injustices: Marketing Race and Credit in America." The paper takes an interesting approach to the issue of how consumer credit gets marketed in the United States. They visited fringe lending establishments as well as the web sites of these establishments and mainstream banks and looked at the persons used as models in their advertisements.

Although I have some questions about the magnitude of the effects--questions that come from how different government agencies Latino or Hispanic heritage sometimes as an ethnicity and sometimes as a racial identity--the core finding of the paper seems right. The models used in the advertisements send a signal about whether the financial service is "for people like you." How those people differ between mainstream banks and fringe lenders will not surprise anyone who has paid even a bit of attention to the structural racism that defines our economy. Hawkins and Penner close the paper with some thoughts on how the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and the Community Reinvestment Act might help fix the problems they identify.

UPDATE (9/26): My apologies to Ms. Penner for misidentifying her in the original title to this post.

A Campaign to Opt-Out

Following-up on my prior post, let’s talk more about what’s at stake in this little legislative kerfuffle in the Hawkeye state, as well as how consumer advocates should seize on this moment in a different way.  

First, repealing this 521 provision in Iowa law is really all about whether states should have, to a large degree, the ability to control the interest rates charged on products and services that are offered to consumers by nonbank firms. 

Many readers of this blog may already know this history backwards and forwards – but for those who don’t, here’s the backstory. In Marquette Nat’l Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the National Bank Act as giving nationally-chartered banks the ability to charge the highest interest rate allowed in the state where the bank is located to borrowers located not only in that state, but also to borrowers located in any other state.  This means, for instance, that a national bank located in Iowa can not only charge the highest interest rate allowable in Iowa to anyone located in Iowa, but it can also charge that same rate to a borrower located in Oklahoma, Louisiana, or any other state.  Even if Louisiana, Oklahoma, or another state’s laws prohibit interest at such a rate, the loan is nevertheless free from being usurious. This concept is known as “interest rate exportation.”  

After the 1978 decision in Marquette, there was a concern about the ability of state-chartered banks to compete with national banks. So, state legislatures started enacting “parity laws” that allowed their state banks to charge the maximum rates of interest allowable by any national bank “doing business” in that particular state. These parity laws were often even broader, granting to state chartered banks all of the incidental powers granted to national banks. In sum, the goal of these parity laws was to put state banks on equal footing with national banks, particularly when it came to usury.  Good so far?

Ok here comes the part dealing with this shady Iowa house bill…

In a final effort to give state-chartered banks a competitive edge, in 1980 Congress passed the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA).  A portion of DIDMCA, specifically section 521 (see where this is going...) granted interest rate exportation to any state-chartered bank that was federally insured (in other words, to all FDIC-insured state-chartered banks). 12 U.S.C. 1831d. This allowed a state-chartered bank to charge out-of-state borrowers the same interest rate allowable for in-state borrowers.  Thus, a state-chartered bank located in Iowa could charge an Oklahoma borrower the Iowa-allowable interest rate, even if that rate was higher than what would otherwise be legal under Oklahoma law. 

But here’s the catch. In Section 525 of DIDMCA, Congress gave states the ability to opt-out of section 521 by enacting legislation stating the state did not want section 521 to apply. Only two jurisdictions opted out: Puerto Rico and…you guessed it…Iowa. In 1980, right after DIDMCA was passed, Iowa opted out per 1980 Iowa Acts, ch. 1156, sec. 32. To add one more bit of background, Iowa also did not enact any parity laws. In fact, a former general counsel to the Iowa Division of Banking stated in a 2002 interview that enacting such a law that delegated control over Iowa state banks to the feds would be seen as “a slap in the face” to the Iowa legislature. 

So, there you have it. This little provision in an otherwise unrelated tax bill is to OPT INTO section 521 and thereby reverse the decision Iowa’s legislature made in 1980.

Now you may say to yourself, why is this so bad? The bad part requires you know something about the rent-a-bank partnership model between certain state-chartered banks and a number of online “fintech” lenders. Since the 2008 financial crisis, a growing number of nonbank fintech firms that make loans over the internet have partnered with a handful of state-chartered banks (mostly chartered in Utah, Kentucky, and New Jersey) in order to make and market unsecured installment consumer loans. By and large the way the business model works is that although the loan application is submitted through the nonbank’s website or smartphone app, it is the partner bank that actually advances the funds. The marketing and underwriting process are both performed by the nonbank. Then, very shortly after, the bank sells the loan along with others (or some interest in those loans) to the nonbank fintech company or an affiliate. The fintech or another firm then sells the interest to a pre-arranged wholesale buyer or sponsors a securitization of a large pool of loans for sale as securities in the capital markets. 

The bank’s role is merely passing, and it typically retains no material economic interest in the loans. However, so the argument goes, because the loan is originated by an insured state-chartered bank, it can export the interest rate of its home state to borrowers located in ANY state (with state usury laws preempted by DIDMCA section 521). And sometimes these loans can be quite expensive (rates of 160% APR or more e.g., CashNet USA, Speedy Cash, Rapid Cash, Check n' Go, Check Into Cash). You can get more info on these partnerships and check out some nifty maps provided by the folks at the National Consumer Law Center here. 

So, here’s how I think consumer advocates can turn the tables. There are a number of states that have aggressively gone after these rent-a-bank schemes (adding a lawsuit by AG of DC to the mix here) and a group of state AGs are currently suing the OCC on account of its true lender rule. In other words, a number of states do not want this kind of high cost, fintech-bank lending happening in their jurisdiction. 

Here’s my suggestion to those states: why not just pass your own opt out of DIDMCA Section 521? 

As mentioned above, many of these online lenders in high-cost rent-a-bank schemes favor partnering with FDIC-insured, state-chartered banks rather than national banks. Opting out of DIDMCA would deprive these schemes of their regulatory arbitrage. Without the ability to import the interest rate law of another state into a given jurisdiction, it would force these online firms to apply for a lending license and otherwise abide by the jurisdiction’s usury limit. DIDMCA allowed states to opt out of Section 521, and the statute didn’t give a deadline to do it. So, here’s a call to states like Colorado and others who are going after these usury and regulatory evasive business models…take away the linchpin of the business model. Opt-out of section 521!

And as for those of us back here in the Hawkeye state, here’s to hoping that the Iowa legislature doesn’t (pardon the Peloton pun) get so easily taken for a ride.

Of Usury, Preemption, and Fancy Stationary Bikes

Greetings, Slipsters! I’m thrilled to be here guest blogging, and I thank the editors for having me. So with that, let me get started…

Usury, preemption, and pandemic fitness are all colliding here in Iowa. 

About two weeks ago, I was alerted to a single strike-through amendment buried in a tax bill currently being considered by the Iowa legislature. This simple little change that eliminates three numbers (“521”) would likely go unnoticed by most lawmakers (or, more realistically—all lawmakers). However, this little change could have a profound impact on Iowa’s ability to prevent high cost, predatory lending from spilling into its borders through website portals and smart phone apps. And, if you stay with me for this bit of guest blogging, you’ll never believe what’s supposedly (so I’m told) behind it all! 

The bill is HSB 272. Most of the bill contains routine tax code clean-ups and modifications. Indeed, the bill itself is sponsored by the Iowa Department of Revenue. But, take a look at the relevant part of Section 5:

1980 Iowa Acts, chapter 1156, section 32, is amended to read as follows: SEC. 32.  The general assembly of the state of Iowa hereby declares and states . . . that it does not want any of the provisions of any of the amendments contained in Public Law No. 96-221 (94 stat. 132), sections 521, 522 and 523 to apply with respect to loans made in this state . . .

If you clicked on the link above and read the entirely of Section 5, you’d probably have to go through the text quite a few times before you’d see what’s being stricken out. The singular change is just the reference to section 521 of Public Law No. 96-221 (94 stat. 132). Otherwise, everything else in this existing statute stays the same. 

So what’s this about? 

The only clue as to what this stricken language actually deals with is the reference to “loans made in this state.” In truth, this single little strikethrough will allow FDIC-insured state-chartered banks located in other states to make loans under the usury laws of their home states to the residents of Iowa. This kind of lending usually comes in the way of partnerships between a handful of state-chartered banks and so-called “fintech” nonbank lenders making triple digit loans, hardly any different from payday financing. This partnership lending practice has also been the subject of recent lawsuits, including a summer 2020 settlement by the Colorado AG. If you’re interested in a deep dive on the rent-a-bank model and the unique legal and policy problems it creates, check out forthcoming articles here (by Adam Levitin) and here (by me!).

The icing on the cake, however, is that the rationale (again, as I’ve been told) advanced by proponents of the bill is that without this amendment, Iowans will not be able to finance the purchase of Pelotons. That’s right. Pelotons!

Here’s the connection: Peloton currently partners with Affirm, a fintech online lender, in order to help consumers finance the purchase of these roughly $3,000 stationary bikes (bike + membership). Interestingly, both firms generally promote 0% down, 0% APR, 0% hidden fees in their financing package. Of course, if you scroll down to the bottom of the promotional website and read the tiny 10.5 point, gray font print, you’ll notice: 

Your rate will be 0–30% APR based on credit, and is subject to an eligibility check. Options depend on your purchase amount, and a down payment may be required. Affirm savings accounts are held with Cross River Bank, Member FDIC. Savings account is limited to six ACH withdrawals per month. Affirm Plus financing is provided by Celtic Bank, Member FDIC. Affirm, Inc., NMLS ID 1883087. Affirm Loan Services, LLC, NMLS ID 1479506. California residents: Affirm Loan Services, LLC is licensed by the Department of Financial Protection and Innovation. Loans are made or arranged pursuant to California Financing Law license 60DBO-111681 (emphasis added).

As you can see, Affirm also plays the rent-a-bank game by partnering with FDIC-insured Utah state bank, Celtic Bank. While 30% APR may not seem like the most expensive loan term in the world, it opens the door to much higher cost lending by firms like Elevate Credit, Opportunity Financial, and more--all of whom use the rent-a-bank model. 

This is about much more than Pelotons…stay tuned for more (including how I think consumer advocates can turn the tables on this strategy!).

UPDATE: It appears that HSB 272 isn't going anywhere: no legislative movement since a canceled House subcommittee hearing on April 6. Meanwhile, a duplicate tax bill has been filed in the Senate, but it does not contain the DIDMCA opt-out (SSB 1268).

Commercial and Contract Law: Questions, Ideas, Jargon

In the Spring I am teaching a research and writing seminar called Advanced Commercial Law and Contracts. Credit Slips readers have been important resources for project ideas in the past, and I'd appreciate hearing what you have seen out in the world on which you wish there was more research, and/or what you think might make a great exploration for an enterprising student. This course is not centered on bankruptcy, but things that happen in bankruptcy unearth puzzles from commercial and contract law more generally, so examples from bankruptcy cases are indeed welcome. You can share ideas through the comments below, by email to me, or direct message on Twitter.

Also, I am considering having the students build another wiki of jargon as I did a few years ago in another course. Please pass along your favorite (or least favorite) terms du jour in commercial finance and beyond.

Thank you as always for your input, especially during such chaotic times.

Coronavirus Will Hasten the Shift To App-Based Banking and Lending. How Will That Affect People's Pocketbooks?

Over at the Machine Lawyering blog -- organized and edited by the Chinese University of Hong Kong's Law Faculty’s Centre for Financial Regulation and Economic Development -- Slipster Nathalie Martin and I just posted some commentary about our new article, Reducing The Wealth Gap Through Fintech "Advances" in Consumer Banking and Lending, forthcoming in the University of Illinois Law Review. The article, in part, assessing new "advances" in fintech products that promise to provide people with lower-cost banking and lending options. We focus on prepaid cards for wages, early wage access programs, and auto lending apps. We conclude that these products more likely than not will prove to be disadvantageous to consumers. The article's connection to the wealth gap is the recognition that high-cost banking and lending products impede people's ability to convert income into savings. We put forth a few ideas about the hallmarks of banking and lending products that actually may help close the wealth gap by targeting Americans’ unequal access to banking and lending services. 

Nathalie and I, of course, wrote this article before the coronavirus pandemic. With stay-at-home orders and social distancing in effect, it is highly likely that people's already increasing use of online and app-based banking and lending products will increase even faster. If our analysis proves correct, the spoils of the increased shift will accrue more to providers than to consumers, and people may be able to save even less of their income. The pandemic has highlighted American's lack of savings. Hopefully helping Americans save will become more of a focus in the future.

Also, on the note of early wage access programs, when we drafted the article, we found effectively no published analysis of early wage access programs. As we were writing, Nakita Cuttino and Jim Hawkins kindly shared their draft articles with us. Both articles are now available SSRN and present interesting (and different) analyzes of early wage access programs. Nakita's article is titled, The Rise of "FringeTech": Regulatory Risk in Early Wage Access. And Jim's article is titled, Earned Wage Access and the End of Payday Lending.

Corona Cash and Refund Anticipation Checks

Vijay Raghavan, who will be joining the Brooklyn Law School faculty this summer shared a troubling observation about the payment of the recovery rebates ("Corona Cash" or "Mnuchin Mnoney") through direct deposit to taxpayers. It seems that the payments for around 15% of individual tax filings might be going to bank accounts that are closed or not controlled by the taxpayers. That 15% is surely a much larger percentage of households eligible for Corona Cash. I wouldn't be surprised if close to a quarter of eligible households are affected.

Raghavan writes:

Recovery rebates (stimulus payments) under the CARES Act are supposed
to go out this week. A number of people have noted that the payments
will be delayed for unbanked consumers and the funds are at risk of
being swept by lenders or debt collectors. What has received less
attention is the fact that many banked or underbanked taxpayers may
not receive their rebates because they financed tax preparation with a
refund anticipation check (“RAC”). [AJL: a RAC is distinct from a refund anticipation loan, when the preparer advances the taxpayer part of the anticipated tax refund.]

RACs allow taxpayers to defer the cost of tax preparation and finance
preparation out of their refund. The refund is deposited in a
temporary bank account that the tax preparer arranges to have opened.
The taxpayer may never be made aware that the temporary account
exists. The refund is then distributed to the taxpayer minus
preparation fees and ancillary fees via check, direct deposit, or
using some other payment instrument.

The conventional wisdom is RACs are primarily used by unbanked
consumers. But many banked or underbanked taxpayers may also use RACs.
Smaller tax prep chains and individual tax prep stores rely on RAC
financing for at least two reasons. First, the intermediaries these
tax preparers use to process the returns charge numerous
per-transaction fees, which are easier to pay for out of a taxpayer’s
refund since the cash-strapped taxpayer can’t afford to pay for the
intermediaries’ services up-front. Second, financing may serve to
conceal inordinately high tax preparation fees. As a result, it is not
uncommon to find tax preparation stores in low-income neighborhoods
that refuse to accept up-front payment and only process RAC-financed
returns. In the 2018 tax year, approximately 21 million returns were
financed with RACs. [AJL: for context, there were around 150 million individual returns filed in 2018.]

RACs present a few problems for stimulus distribution. If returns were
already filed and processed, the temporary banks accounts may be
closed, which will delay distribution of the rebate. If the temporary
account is still open, the rebate may sit in the account without being
distributed. There should be less problems if returns have not been
filed or are still pending. But if refunds are initially distributed
to the tax preparer as opposed to the taxpayer (which happens in some
cases), there is some risk tax preparer may take the CARES Act money.

The good news is large chains like H&R Block and tax software
companies should have bank account information for the returns they
processed. They could turn this data over to the Treasury but the
CARES Act may limit the Treasury's ability to disburse payments. The
CARES Act seems to only allow electronic disbursement to accounts the
taxpayer has previously authorized. Taxpayers who regularly financed
tax prep with RACs likely have not authorized disbursement to their
own bank account or may not maintain an open bank account in regular
use. Treasury probably has to lean on preparers and software companies
to ensure that payments to RAC-financed returns are disbursed to the
taxpayer bank accounts.

The problems in doing a quick disbursal of Corona Cash highlight some deficiencies in the US payment and banking system. The House counterproposal to the CARES Act had in it a provision for the creation of FedAccounts--giving every consumer a bank account held at the Fed. It's kind of late in the game to try and set up such a system to deal with the corona virus crisis, but the crisis is exposing areas that need to be shored up going forward. 

Trump Administration Declares Open Season on Consumers for Subprime Lenders

The Trump administration has just proposed a rule that declares open season on consumers for subprime lenders. The Office of Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (on whose board the CFPB Director serves) have released parallel proposed rulemakings that will effectively allowing subprime consumer lending that is not subject to any interest rate regulation, including by unlicensed lenders.

Libra and Financial Inclusion

Facebook’s proposed Libra cryptocurrency project has truly stirred up a hornet’s nest of controversy.  Critics have generally focused on Libra as a currency and the power of Facebook in society and its appropriation of users’ privacy.  

I think that discussion misses a key point.  Libra will be, first and foremost, a payment system.  It will be a payment system that happens to operate using a currency index, rather than a single country’s currency, and clear using blockchain rather than other clearing software, but it’s still a payment system, that is a system for moving value between parties.  The payment system aspect is what both makes me incredibly skeptical about Libra’s financial inclusion claims and about Libra’s prospects for success. 

New Paper: Consumer Protection After the Global Financial Crisis

Historian Ed Balleisen and I have just posted a paper of interest to Credit Slips readers who are interested in consumer protection, financial crises, and inputs into post-crisis policymaking more generally. I will let the abstract speak for itself:

Consumer Protection After the Global Financial Crisis

Edward J. Balleisen & Melissa B. Jacoby

Abstract

Like other major events, the Global Financial Crisis generated a large and diffuse body of academic analysis. As part of a broader call for operationalizing the study of crises as policy shocks and resulting responses, which inevitably derail from elegant theories, we examine how regulatory protagonists approached consumer protection after the GFC, guided by six elements that should be considered in any policy shock context. After reviewing the introduction and philosophy of the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, created as part of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, we consider four examples of how consumer protection unfolded in the crises’ aftermath that have received less attention. Our case studies investigate a common set of queries. We sought to identify the parties who cared sufficiently about a given issue to engage with it and try to shape policy, as well as the evolving nature of the relevant policy agenda. We also looked for key changes in policy, which could be reflected in various forms—whether establishing an entirely new regulatory agency, formulating novel enforcement strategies, or deflecting policy reforms.

The first of our case studies focuses on operations of the Federal Trade Commission in the GFC’s aftermath. Although the Dodd-Frank Act shifted some obligations toward the CFPB, we find that the FTC continued to worry about and seek to address fraud against consumers. But it tended to focus on shady practices that arose in response to the GFC rather than those that facilitated it. Our second case study examines the Congressional adoption of a carveout from CFPB authority for auto dealers, which resulted from strong lobbying by car companies worried about a cratering sales environment, and the aftermath of the policy. Here, we observe that this carveout allowed a significant amount of troubling auto lending activity to continue and expand, with potentially systemic consequences. Loan servicer misbehavior, particularly in the form of robosigning, is the focus of our third case study. Although Dodd-Frank did not explicitly address robosigning, the new agency it created, the CFPB, was able to draw on its broad authority to address this newly arising problem. And, because the CFPB had authority over student loan servicers, the agency could pivot relatively quickly from the mortgage context to the student loan context. Our fourth and final case study is the rise and fall of Operation Choke Point, an understandably controversial interagency program, convened by the U.S. Department of Justice, which, with the GFC fresh in mind, attempted to curtail fraudulent activities by cutting off access to online payment mechanisms. Here, we see an anti-fraud effort that was particularly vulnerable to a change in presidential administration and political climate because its designers had invested little effort in building public awareness and support for the program.

The Article concludes with an overall assessment and suggestions for other focal points for which our approach would be useful. The examples span a range of other domestic and global policy contexts.

 

 

 

Usury 2.0: Toward a Universal Ability-to-Repay Requirement

There's bi-partisan legislation pending that would prohibit the practice of installment lenders sending out unsolicited live convenience check loan:  you get an unsolicited check in the mail.  If you cash it, you've entered into a loan agreement.  

The debate about check loans has turned on whether consumers understand what they're getting into.  The legislation's sponsors say consumers don't understand all the terms and conditions, while the installment lender trade association, the American Financial Services Association, argues that there's no problem with live check loans because all the terms are clearly disclosed in large type font.  

This debate about consumer understanding and clarity of disclosure totally misses the point.  The key problem with check loans is that they are being offered without regard for the consumer's ability to repay.  For some consumers, check loans might be beneficial.  But for other they're poison.  The problem is that check loans are not underwritten for ability-to-repay, which is a problem for a product that is potentially quite harmful.  Ability to repay is the issue that should be discussed regarding check loans, not questions about borrower understanding.  Indeed, this is not an issue limited to check loans.  Instead, it is an issue that cuts across all of consumer credit.  Rather than focus narrowly on check loans, Congress should consider adopting a national ability-to-repay requirement for all consumer credit (excluding federal student loans).  

Unsolicited, Live Check-Credit

The Washington Post has an interesting story about consumer installment lender Mariner Finance.  Three brief observations.

First, Mariner has found an interesting regulatory loophole.  The Truth in Lending Act prohibits the issuance of "live," unsolicited credit cards.  That provision, however, only applies to devices that can be used for multiple extensions of credit, not single use items like a check. So Mariner can mail out live checks to consumers (it presumably prescreens a population to target), without running afoul of the federal prohibition on mailing live, unsolicited credit cards.  That's a  creative way of reaching customers without having an extensive and expensive brick-and-mortar presence.  It also avoids some of the adverse selection problems of internet-based lending.

Second, there is no federal preemption obstacle to states prohibiting the issuance of live, unsolicited checks used to create a credit balance. Mariner seems to be the only major firm doing this, and it doesn't have any preemption argument I can see.  

Third, no one should be shocked that large financial institutions provide the money behind Mariner. Large banks don't do small dollar lending themselves; there are too many regulatory and repetitional issues, but they will provide the financing for small dollar lenders, whether by providing lines of credit or by making equity investments in them. And this has political consequences:  the lobby opposing the regulation of small dollar lenders isn't just finance companies, but also the large financial institutions that are funding them.  Consider how that might affect efforts to close the unsolicited live check loophole on either the federal or state level. 

 

The Bootstrap Trap

I just had the pleasure of reading Duke Law Professor Sara Sternberg Greene's paper The Bootstrap Trap.  I highly recommend it for anyone who is interested in the intersection of consumer credit and poverty law.  The paper is chok full of good insights about the problems that arise when low-income households strive for the goal of self-sufficiency, which results in the replacement of a public welfare safety net with what Professor Sternberg Green describes as a private one of credit reporting and scoring systems.  The paper shows off Professor Sternberg Greene's training in sociology with some amazing interviews, particularly about the perceived importance of credit scores in low-income consumers' lives.  

Other respondents referred to their credit reports or scores as “the most important thing in my life, right now, well besides my babies,” as “that darned thing that is destroying my life,” and as “my ticket to good neighborhoods and good schools for my kids.” Many respondents believed that a “good” credit score was the key to financial stability.

One respondent, Maria, told a story about a friend who was able to improve his score. She said, “He figured out some way to get it up. Way up. I wish I knew what he did there, because I would do it. Because after that, everything was easy as pie for him. Got himself a better job, a better place to live, everything better.” Maria went to great lengths to try to improve her score so that she, too, could live a life where everything was “easy as pie.”

Credit scores have become a metric of self worth and the perceived key to success.  

New Study Tells Inside Story of how Local Communities use Ordinances to say ‘Enough’ to Payday Lenders

Robert Mayer of the University of Utah and I just finished an 18-month study of community approaches to controlling payday lending . The study concludes with ten lessons communities can use to pass similar ordinances on any subject matter. In The Power of Community Action: Anti-Payday Loan Ordinances in Three Metropolitan Areas, we document how local communities positively organize to control payday lending in their jurisdictions and thereby create important legal change. Our whole report as well as an executive summery can be found  here. 

We hope this study will galvanize local communities and show them how they can make a difference in changing the law and society as a whole, Payday loans, which are borrowed against future paychecks and can carry interest rates of 400 percent or more, often strip wealth from society’s most economically vulnerable individuals and communities. These loan outlets now outnumber all McDonald’s, Burger King, Starbucks and Walgreens stores combined. In states where legislative controls are weak — and in the absence of federal regulations — some local governments have stepped forward to address the problems caused by high-cost, predatory payday loans.The researchers traveled to three regions — Silicon Valley in Northern California; Greater Metropolitan Dallas in Texas; and Greater Salt Lake City in Utah — to see how local entities have produced numerous ordinances aimed at halting the spread of payday lending. The locations were chosen for their diverse demographic, cultural, political and legal characteristics.

Auto Title Lending: Exploding Toasters

The CFPB has a new report out on auto title lending, and the findings are jaw-dropping. If ever there was a consumer financial product that looks like an exploding toaster, it is an auto title loan.  Default rates on auto title loans are one in three, with one in five resulting in a repossession. Is there any consumer product that is tolerated when one out of three products blows up? Even one in five? 

There's a lot of good data in the report (which assiduously avoids any interpretation, but just presents the facts), but beyond the default rates, here's what really jumps out at me: over 80% of the loans roll over and around half result in sequences of 10 or more loans.  That means that rather than viewing auto title loans as short term products with an extension option, they are really used more like longer-term products with a prepayment option. But more importantly, it tells us something about how to interpret default rates.  

The Promise and Limits of Postal Banking

It’s easy for Progressives to get excited about the idea of postal banking: a public option for banking! What’s not to love?

I’m glad to see the idea of public options in financial services getting some play of late; it’s something I’ve championed for a while in payments and housing finance. But I think it’s necessary to recognize some of the limits to postal banking. In particular, it's not at all clear to me why we would want to involve the Post Office in the public provision of financial services. What the Post Office offers is a way to recreate a brick-and-mortar branch bank network. This really doesn't make a lot of sense for 21st century banking. Additionally, postal banking is often pitched as an alternative to payday and title lenders. Before we go running down that path, we should think about what it means to have the government in the payday lending business.

It Is Very Expensive To Be Poor

Cash checking fees, prepaid card fees, money transfer fees, cashier's check fees -- all together, the unbanked pay up to 10% of their income simply to use their own money. And when lower-income people face an emergency, they must turn to expensive payday loans, title loans, and tax refund loans. As Mehrsa Baradaran (University of Georgia) writes in her new book, How the Other Half Banks: Exclusion, Exploitation, and the Threat to Democracy, "indeed, it is very expensive to be poor."

How did this happen? And how might we begin to solve the problem? In her book, Baradaran details how banks and government are and always have been inextricably tied, with the government helping banks and the banks supposedly helping the public in return. But this "social contract" has eroded. The banking sector has turned away from less profitable markets, leaving people with small sums of money to deposit without a trustworthy place to stash their cash, and people in need of small sums of money to borrow nowhere to turn but fringe lenders. Moreover, these people understandably often are uncomfortable dealing with large banks. And the result is that an astonishing large chunk of the American population is unbanked or underbanked.

If the unbanked and underbanked had a trustworthy place to deposit their cash, some of the fees they pay simply to use their money would go away. This alone might allow families to stay financially afloat. Likewise, if they had the option to borrow small sums of money at reasonable rates, temporary financial emergencies may not set so many families up for a lifetime of financial failure. Which leads Baradaran to a proposal that I’m fond of (indeed, I’ve blogged about Baradaran’s thoughts on it before): postal banking.

Churches as an Alternative to Payday Lenders

Payday loans are exceedingly expensive, often trapping borrowers into a cycle of rolling their loan over for many months while interest compounds. Postal banking has been suggested as a way to provide people with better access to less-expensive loans. And the CFPB has indicated that it intends to regulate payday and similar high-cost loans (maybe that will happen soon?). In the meantime, some churches apparently have taken matters into their own hands.

A recent Washington Post article describes how churches in Virginia have helped some of their members secure manageable loans from the Jubilee Assistance Fund (very apt name) and the Virginia United Methodist Credit Union. ("Faith-based" credit unions exist across the country and also offer loans to churches. A few of these credit unions end up as creditors in churches' Chapter 11 cases). The article reports that similar church-run lending programs are sprinkled across the country, with churches in some states seemingly having more coordinated efforts.

In the face of the payday industry, these programs undoubtedly are a blessing to the lucky church members who are able to obtain loans. The existence of these programs--and the interesting personal stories in the article--perhaps show how crucial regulation of the high-cost lending industry is, as well as indicate how desperately many people want and would benefit from access to lower-cost lending options.

Prepaid Card Use on the Rise Among Unbanked and Underbanked

Last week, the FDIC released its 2013 National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households. Some of the Survey's results were similar to the FDIC's 2009 and 2011 surveys. 7.7% of households were unbanked. Another 20% of households were underbanked. I took note of the Survey because its maps of unbanked and underbanked rates by state have been receiving some attention online. But what I think is more intriguing are the Survey's questions about prepaid cards.

General purpose reloadable prepaid cards, though still a small segment of the consumer financial
products market, have grown rapidly in past years -- from $28.6 billion in 2009 to close to $65 billion in 2012 (as previously discussed). Consistent with this growth in dollars, the Survey found that prepaid card use had increased among all households from 2009 to 2013 -- from 9.9% to 12%. More interestingly, the share of unbanked households that used prepaid cards had increased more dramatically -- from 12.2% in 2009 to 17.8% in 2011 to 27.1% in 2013. By comparison, 19.6% of underbanked households and 8.8% of fully banked households had used prepaid cards in 2013. When combined, unbanked and underbanked households comprised the majority (55%) of prepaid card users in the previous 12 months.

Local and State Treasurers Can Build Wealth in Struggling Communities

Sometimes you can beat the door down with efforts to get Federal and State officials to tackle problems, but at the end of the day, locals can best get the job done, quietly and quickly. A story in Monday’s New York Times bears this out.  For example, San Francisco City Treasure Jose Cisneros noticed that families who finally took advantage the of the earned income credit, the country’s largest public benefit program, often had no bank accounts in which to deposit their refunds. This meant losing a portion of this important public benefit to check cashers and others.

Because of this problem, Treasurer Cisneros started a program called Bank On, that helps people on the financial fringes open bank accounts and develop credit histories. This model has spread across the country, leading the Treasury Department to conclude that Bank On has “great potential” to “create a nationwide initiative that attends to the needs of underserved families and works to eradicate financial instability throughout the country.” In 2010, Mr. Cisneros also started Kindergarten to College, a program that automatically opened a bank account with $50 ($100 for low-income families) for every kindergartner in public schools. The city pays for the administration and initial deposits, while corporate, foundation and private donations provide matching money to encourage families to save more. His office even figured out how to open bank accounts for thousands of children without social security numbers.

These and similar effort have now been replicated in more than 100 cities, showing that even mundane public races might make a big difference in the health and well-being of citizens, if not the entire U.S. economy.

Is a 36% Cap Radical?

I was pleased to see today’s New York Times editorial entitled “A Rate Cap for All Consumer Loans.”  It created a very public description of an industry indiscretion involving loaning money to the military at over 36%. Those loans are illegal because a federal law makes it so, a law that passed with broad and deep bipartisan support because trapping military personnel in high-cost loans interferes with military readiness and thus threatens national security. This editorial, not in some fringe publication, but rather the New York Times, argues that we all deserve the same protections from high cost loans.  I agree (in this recent article), and think the time is right to start listening to people and not industry on this topic.

Is a federal 36% cap radical? Historically, 36% would seem heinously high. Plus, if 36% is radical, why does much of the U.S.‘s eastern seaboard's state law forbid consumer loans with interest rates of over 36%? Are these radical states? The public favors a hard cap, over and over again in every study,  regardless of politics. Hearing politicians support consumer loans with 500% or even 1,000% interest, is so mysterious it makes me want to look at their list of campaign contributors.  Remember, real people over political contributions. We elect politicians and pay their salaries. In turn, they speak for us. Do you like what they are saying?

Online Payday Loans Cost More Than Storefront Payday Loans And Customers Are Harassed More Egregiously

Over the last couple years, The Pew Charitable Trusts has put together a useful series of reports regarding payday lending in the United States. The fourth installment was released on October 2. Its title is quite descriptive: "Fraud and Abuse Online: Harmful Practices in Internet Payday Lending". The report documents aggressive and illegal actions taken by online payday lenders, most prominently those lenders that are not regulated by all states: harassment, threats, unauthorized dissemination of personal information and accessing of checking accounts, and automated payments that do not reduce principal loan amounts, thereby initiating an automatic renewal of the loan(!). Storefront lenders engage in some of the same tactics, but online lenders' transgressions seem to be more egregious and more frequent.

Putting these disturbing actions aside, are consumers getting a better deal online than at storefronts? Given the lower operating costs, it is logical to assume that these exorbitantly expensive loans might be just that much less expensive if purchased online? Nope. Lump-sum loans obtained online typically cost $25 per $100 borrowed, for an approximate APR of 650%. The national average APR of a store-front lump-sum loan is 391%. Why the disparity on price and severity of collection efforts?

New Case Holding High-Cost Loans Unconscionable and a Payday Loan Video

 A little bit of payday loan news for our readers. First, the New Mexico Supreme Court has held that 1100% high cost installment loans (the payday loan substitute in states where payday loans are illegal) are unconscionable.

Also, did you see John Oliver’s bit on payday loans this weekend? Take a look.  It even features Sarah Silversman. Warning: There is some bad language in the video.

Operation Choke Point Hysteria: Are Choke Point's Critics Responsible for the Account Closings?

At today's House Judiciary Committee hearing on Operation Choke Point it seemed that Choke Point's critics are conflating a fairly narrow DOJ civil investigation with separate general guidance given by prudential regulators.  In particular, Rep. Issa attempted to tie them together by noting that the DOJ referenced such guidance in its Choke Point subpoenas, but that's quite different than actually bringing a civil action on such a basis (or on the basis of "reputational risk"), which the DOJ has not done.  

There is a serious issue regarding the bank regulators' use of "guidance" to set policy. Guidance is usually informal and formally non-binding, but woe to the bank that does not comply--regulators have a lot of off-the-radar ways to make a bank's life miserable.  This isn't a Choke Point issue--this is a general problem that prudential bank regulation just doesn't fit within the administrative law paradigm.  There are lots of reasons it doesn't and perhaps shouldn't, but when it is discovered by people from outside of the banking world, it seems quite shocking, even though this is how bank regulation has always been done in living memory:  a small amount of formal rule-making and a lot of informal regulatory guidance.  By the same token, however, compliance with informal guidance is enforced informally, through the supervisory process, not through civil actions, precisely because the informal guidance is not actionable.  Yet, that is what Choke Point critics contend is being done--that DOJ is using civil actions to enforce informal guidance.  

I don't think that's correct (or at least it hasn't been shown).  But the conflation of DOJ action with prudential regulatory guidance may be creating the very problem Choke Point's critics fear.  

Bank compliance officers may be hearing what Choke Point critics are saying and believing it and acting on it.  If compliance officers believe that the DOJ will come after any bank that serves the high-risk industries identified by the FDIC or FinCEN, not just those that knowingly facilitate or wilfully ignore fraud, they will respond accordingly.  The safe thing to do in the compliance world is to follow the herd and avoid risks.  The attack on Operation Choke Point may well have spooked banks' compliance officers, who'd aren't going to parse through the technical distinctions involved.  

What matters is not what the DOJ actually does, but what compliance officers think the DOJ is doing, and they're likely to head the loudest voice in the room, that of Choke Point's critics.  So to the extent that we are having account terminations increasing after word got out of Operation Choke Point it might be because of Choke Point's critics' conflation of a narrowly tailored civil investigation with broad prudential guidance.  Ironically, we may have a self-fulfilling hysteria whipped up by Choke Point critics, who shoot first and ask questions later.  

Being Unbanked, Part 1

Note from Katie Porter: This guest post is from Jennifer Song, senior staff attorney at the California Monitor Program. Jennifer pitched in and attended this workshop, and I hope Credit Slips readers will enjoy hearing about her experiences in a short series of posts. 

Last week, I, Jennifer Song, had the opportunity to join FinX/LA 2014:  Connecting to the Consumer Financial Experience.  Hosted by the Center for Financial Services Innovation as part of their three-day conference on consumer financial services,  FinX was an “in-the-field activity” that promised to give participants a “deeper understanding of the complexity of consumers’ financial lives in accessing financial services.” 

Upon arriving at the conference, we were placed into groups of four and given worksheets. The tasks to complete included cashing a personal check, cashing a pay check, purchasing a general purpose reloadable card and reloading the card, purchasing a money order, inquiring about auto title loans, etc.  We were given a little over two hours to complete these tasks in lower income areas throughout Los Angeles. With only a quick slideshow of interesting facts and a pep talk, we set off on our journey. 

While I will share my experience and how it shaped my thinking on low-income banking, I want to start by identifying factors that may have prevented me from fully experiencing and understanding the challenges facing the under banked and unbanked. First, we were traveled in groups of four; most people using these services do not travel in packs or with an entourage, and are not able to consult each other about transactions.  Second, while we were told to “dress down” in order to “blend in” while performing these transactions, I do not believe we were fooling anyone at the shops we visited.  Third, and perhaps the most glaring contrast, was that we were chauffeured around Los Angeles in a town car to perform these transactions. While I assume there is access to public transportation in or around these financial centers, Los Angeles is notorious for being difficult to navigate via the public transportation system (did you even know it has a subway?) Many of the financial centers were clustered together but major banking institutions were noticeably absent in these areas. 

I am Approved for a Payday Loan

Received the automated call to my cell phone yesterday morning, whereupon my phone recorded a 45 second message. Not only am I approved for a payday loan in the amount of up to $1,500, I apparently previously applied for a payday loan, and given that "as of April 2014, our lenders have lowered their requirements for loan qualification, I am now approved" (emphasis added). (I did not apply for a payday loan, ever, for the record.) All I need to do is go to this handy website and enter my pre-approval/promo code, which was provided to me twice during the call. The call ended by assuring me that there were no hidden fees to get my loan and congratulating me again.

The unsolicited call was very timely in light of my previous post hypothesizing that payday lenders will venture even more into the Internet arena in the near future. I wonder how this lending network got my cell number (someone sold it to them? data breach?), and how they decided my number belonged to a person from whom it would be productive to solicit business. As they transition to more Internet lending, maybe payday lenders are really widening their targeting? In fact, I received a call a few months ago from a live person asking me if I wanted to consolidate my payday loans. (How many payday loans does the industry think I have?) I replied, "that sounds interesting, tell me more about this consolidation thing." To which the caller questioned, rather sternly, "do you have any payday loans?" Upon hearing that I have none, the caller promptly hung up. Based on my completely anecdotal experiences, the world of payday lending is getting larger and larger.

Will 2014 Be the Year the Bureau Takes on Payday Lending? If So, What Data Will They Use in Regulating?

 To question number one, it looks that way. According to Kim Chapman and Carter Dougherty at Bloomberg, as well as other news outlets, Director Richard Cordray has announced his intention to move forward with regulations aimed at lenders that make small loans like payday loans, title loans, and installment loans with triple digit interest rates.  The question of course is what this “oversight” and “regulation” will look like. Will the rules look something like those in Colorado, which still permits loans of up to 200% in some cases? See Pew report on this issue. Will the new regulations deem certain practices of lenders unfair and deceptive?  Will regulation of online lenders be included? What empirical data will be considered in devising these regulations? Hopefully not that found in a paper I recently read on the Online Lenders Alliance website, entitled Assessing the Optimism of Payday Loan Borrowers.

The punch line of this study is that most payday loan borrowers expect to repay their loan on its due date and not borrow again.  Indeed, most of the borrowers in the survey did just that. Paid it back quickly.  The majority of the paper’s sample population of payday loan borrowers expected to repay the loan on its due date and not borrow again.  Only 40 percent expected to have the loan out for more than one pay period, and the mean duration of indebtedness that those borrowers expected was 36 days.  Interesting. 

CFPB What Have You Done for Me Lately? The Cash America Case, For One Thing

The CFPB just settled an enormous enforcement action against payday lender Cash America. Under the settlement, Cash America will pay $5 million in penalties and $14 million in refunds to overcharged customers. The CFPB found that Cash America or its affiliates robo-signed documents in debt collection lawsuits, made loans to military servicemen in violation of the federal Military Lending Act, and even destroyed documents during discovery. 

My student Andrew Anders is writing a paper about the other enforcement actions the CFPB has been bringing. As most of you know, the Dodd-Frank Act gives the CFPB various enforcement powers including the authority to engage in administrative enforcement actions (typically followed by a consent order) and to bring civil litigation proceedings. The CFPB is required to report all public enforcement actions to which it is a party, which is where Andy got his data, all from 2012.

During the time period of January 1, 2012 through December 31, 2012, the CFPB was involved in nine public enforcement actions. Of these actions, five were administrative actions and four were

Military Lending Act Has Loopholes Says NY Times Dealbook

Just as I was getting ready to roll out an article agreeing with Creola Johnson and explaining why Congress should implement a 36% cap, like the Military Lending Act, for all of us, the Dealbook rolled out this story.  As it turns out, the Military Lending Act is not stopping payday-style lending to the military after all.

Alarmed that payday lenders were preying on military members, Congress in 2006 passed the law, which was intended to shield servicemen and women from the loans tied to a borrower’s next paycheck. These loans carry double-digit or triple-digit interest rates and plunge customers into debt. Now, seven years since the Military Lending Act came into effect, government authorities say the law has gaps that threaten to leave hundreds of thousands of service members across the country vulnerable to potentially predatory loans — from credit pitched by retailers to pay for electronics or furniture, to auto-title loans to payday-style loans. The law, the authorities say, has not kept pace with high-interest lenders that focus on servicemen and women, both online and near bases.
The short-term loans not covered under the law’s interest rate cap of 36 percent include loans for more than $2,000, loans that last for more than 91 days and auto-title loans with terms longer than 181 days.

Lenders who specialize in ripping off military personnel have official sounding names like Military Financial, Just Military Loans, and Patriot Loans. They like lending to the military because they get paid from the military allotment, which virtually assures payment.  Moreover, soldiers have to stay in good financial shape in order to maintain their security clearance, which means lenders have maximum leverage over their borrowers.  One lenders web site claims “We know the military because we are former military,” Lenders also lure customers by offering $25 Starbucks gift cards for referrals and throw parties with free  food.

A Few Things to Consider Before Federal or State Regulators Cave to Requests of Tribal Lenders to Back Off

Carter Dougherty added last week to the many recent articles (here and here) on regulators who are cracking down on internet lending, both state and federal. First, the Justice Department has been asking banks to cut ties to online lenders whom regulators suspect of shady business practices. Various governmental entities have even issued subpoenas to banks and other companies that handle payments for an array of financial offerings, ramping up an investigation that has been under way for several months, according to Justice Department officials. New York state is also cracking down. New York has even filed suit, alleging that lenders, including television advertiser Western Skies, were charging consumers ten times what New York State law allows.   

Last week though, Mr. Dougherty reported that an association of online lenders claiming to be operated by Native American tribes, The Native American Financial Services Association (NAFA)(which represents just 16 of the 566 federally-recognized Indian tribes in the U.S.) called on banks to resist pressure from the state of New York State to cut them off from the nation’s primary payment system, claiming violations of tribal sovereign immunity. 

Payday, Title, and Installment Lenders Show Signs of Strain

Given the many ways in which payday lenders have been able to transform themselves  into title lenders and installment lenders, and to otherwise avoid state law,  l try not to get too optimistic that high-cost lending practices  will be curbed. Yet I feel a bit hopeful after reading Paul Kiel’s recent ProPublica article  The Payday Playbook: How High Cost Lenders Fight to Stay Legal.

In this piece,  Kiel continutes his superb coverage of these products by chronicling the citizen’s ballot initiative undertaken by  Missouri consumers once they realized that their legislature was “bought and paid for” and would not be outlawing high-cost credit in Missouri. According to this article, citizens leading and participating in the ballot initiative, which included many religious organizations and non-profits, were tracked down, sworn at and yelled at by employees of  Missourians for Equal Credit Opportunity (“MECO”), a non-profit formed by the high-cost credit industry. And that is not the half of it. Clergy organizing the ballot initiative (many from African- American churches) received a “legal notice” in the mail from  MECO, threatening criminal sanctions for “the collection of signatures for an initiative petition.” Say what? Then MECO filed a lawsuit to try to stop the organizers from collecting signatures for the ballot initiative, under grounds that were, well, groundless.  As many of you know, ballot initiatives have been used in many states to eradicate payday lending, among hundreds of other purposes. Finally, MECO ran television ads featuring clandestine figures in dark suits instructing voters that “if someone asks you to sign a voter petition, just decline to sign.” When none of this seemed certain to kill the ballot initiative, 5,000 ballots were stolen out of one organizer’s car.

When did the usual efforts of transforming loans (from payday to title or installment) and lenders (from payday lender to CSO to tribe to off-shore) become not enough to survive? Am I the only one catching a whiff of desperation here?

 

Interesting Automatic Stay Decision in FastBucks Chapter 11 Case

Readers might recall that back in November, I blogged about a case in which the unconscionability doctrine was used to invalidate one lender’s entire book of payday and installment loans. The post described how the court found that FastBucks employees encouraged borrows to not pay off loans, which loans were found to violate state law. We in New Mexico, where the case was brought, watched to see if the FaskBucks shops would close down, but they never did. Rather, Fastbucks filed some motions and an appeal in state court, then filed for Chapter 11 on December 10, 2012. Their largest creditor? The State of New Mexico.

FastBucks removed the New Mexico lawsuit to federal court, to be heard as part of its bankruptcy case. FastBucks also filed an adversary proceeding seeking to recover for violation of the stay and to enjoin the New Mexico Attorney General’s Office (the plaintiff in the suit) from:

Usury and the Loan Shark Myth

Consumer financial education, disclosure, and defaults all dispensed with in my prior posts, shall we move on to “substantive” regulation, dare I even say “usury”? Before we do that, I need to clear up another myth that, like the belief in the efficacy of consumer financial education, is deeply ingrained: the loan shark myth.

Forthcoming in the Washington & Lee Law Review is a historical expose of the relationship – or lack thereof – between credit price regulation in the small loan market and loan sharking. The author, political scientist Robert Mayer, finds that what the popular culture has called loan sharking consists of two different types: violent and nonviolent. Both have been characterized by: (1) high prices, in excess of usury restrictions where such restrictions have applied, and (2) short-term, nonamortizing loans made to people who have a decent likelihood of being able to pay the interest amount due at maturity but a low likelihood of being able to pay off the principal balance, resulting in a steady stream of interest income to the lender as the loans roll over and over. It is this second feature that in the 19th Century first earned even nonviolent loan sharks their “shark” moniker – a single loan, even if it is expensive, looks harmless enough, but stealthily traps the borrower in a cycle of debt.

The Behavioral Economics of Title Lending

This week we have discussed some of the interesting facts our recent research has uncovered about the title lending industry and its borrowers. One of the goals of our research is to use economics tools, from both neo-classical and behavioral economics, to develop a broader understanding of how borrowers are making choices in this market.

Title Lending’s Big Question: Dude, Where's My Car?

In a new paper on title lending with Katie Fritzdixon and Jim Hawkins, we report data from a survey of over 400 title lending customers across three states. To introduce this work, we wanted to start off by talking about the important issues that title lending raises. The biggest question, by far, is how many title borrowers end up losing their car?

Pawnbroking: The Hot New (Ancient) Credit Market

Thanks for having me back at Credit Slips! This week I’ll be blogging about two forms of credit that are increasingly popular: auto title lending and pawnshops.

Pawnbroking is back, and in a big way. Recent television shows like Pawn Stars and Hardcore Pawn are a testament to the resurging interest in this ancient form of lending. In a new paper with Susan Payne Carter and Marieke Bos, "The Pawn Industry and Its Customers: The United States and Europe,"we document important facts about the pawn business. Pawnbrokers take collateral or a “pledge,” (anything from jewelry to tools to dental implants!) in exchange for about 50 percent of the item’s resale value, plus interest.

State Payday Lending News Part II: Oregon Warns Tribal Payday Lenders to Back Off

A little something more to chew on while you are chewing off your fingernails over tonight’s election news. As reported on Turtle Talk this morning, Oregon and Washington are none too pleased about tribal payday lenders making loans to citizens of their state, in contravention of their state usury laws. Online tribal payday lenders are setting up shop on Native land in order to get the benefits of sovereign immunity, as Josh Schwartz and I wrote about in our Washington and Lee Law Review article.

According to a story posted on a Portland Oregon tv web site, tribal loans are now at the center of a legal battle at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. An Oregon senator is now trying to push a bill that he authored through the U.S. Senate, which would provide that lenders may not operate out of a tribal reservation or overseas, or anywhere else, if the resulting loans violate of state laws. If this federal bill became law, the Consumer Fraud Protection Bureau would have the power to stop the lending.The turtle talk post also linked to a warning to consumers posted by the Oregon Division of Finance and Corporate Securities. This link contains a partial list of the tribal payday lenders.

State Payday Lending News Part I: New Mexico Court Finds FastBucks Loans to be Unconscionable

A little something to chew on while you are chewing off your fingernails over tonight’s election news. The New Mexico Attorney General’s office has sued Fastbucks for providing unconscionable loans to New Mexico citizens, both under the common law unconscionability doctrine and the state’s Unfair Practices Act’s unconscionability provision. Read the short, pithy opinion Download Fastbucks decision.

The court’s opinion, karmatically handed down on Yom Kippur 2012, found that FastBuck steered borrowers into loans that subjected them to higher interest rates and kept them locked into recurring cycles of debt, that the FastBucks entities were experts in the loan products they created, and that these experts demonstrated their superior knowledge of these alternative loan products through their explicit actions to maneuver around the regulation of payday loans.  The court also found that defendants provided incentives to their representatives for steering borrowers into the more expensive installment loan products and away from less expensive loan products, and for promoting and prolonging recurring inescapable indebtedness.

Brains for Hire

Posting again on fiction so soon? Not the original intention, but I recently read a story that skirts around the substantive core of Credit Slips, as well as the fabulous work of sociologist Viviana Zelizer, a past Credit Slips guest. Blame or gratitude can be sent c.o.d. to Charles Yu, a lawyer when he is not writing things like Standard Loneliness Package (also in Yu's recently published collection). The thirty-nine year old narrator receives 12/hour to absorb the pain and bad feelings from wealthy customers who pay 100, 200, 2,000/hour to be devoid of such pain and bad feelings. The price varies for watching a loved one die, a funeral, surgeries, root canal, breakups, firings, quittings, nose dives in the stock market (priced higher than some deaths). The company will not quote a price for death of a child.

The Gender Divide in Payday Lending

Nathalie Martin has done great work and has posted comments on Creditslips.org regarding payday lending. I also have been interested in how these payday loans prey on consumers with the least resources and power, and have helped consumers with related issues through my outreach work. At the same time, I have had the privilege to have students like Adria Robinson, who take great interest in these consumer issues. Adria Robinson is so passionate about consumer issues that she volunteered to work with me in gathering the latest data on Colorado's payday lending post-passage of its new payday regulations in August of 2010. Thanks to Adria for her help with this post!

Is Loaning Money at a 350% APR Evil?

In the early part of this year, a new start-up called ZestCash launched. Founded by former Google CIO, Douglas Merrill, it appears to be an attempt at short-term consumer lending with a Google-like "don't be evil" approach and markets itself as an alternative to payday loans.The venture caught my eye when mentioned in the New York Times this weekend as part of a story about Gil Ebaz's work of adding value to different services by providing better, more reliable data.

Credit for Parenthood (in the Wall Street Journal)

Wall Street Journal Reporter Jessica Silver-Greenberg casts a spotlight on the market for fertility treatment loans - including loans that enable the purchase of other women's eggs  - in the article "In Vitro a Fertile Niche for Lenders."  (subscription required). Perhaps this will prompt some coverage of the adoption loan market, which also has very interesting not-for-profit lending options; the direct financial price of the credit may be low but some complicated strings are attached. My earlier efforts to broadly evaluate the impact of loans in these markets are here and here. 

Buy Here Pay Here Dealerships

The LA Times did a three-part series this fall on what they call "Buy Here Pay Here" car dealerships. (Here is Part One, Part Two, and Part Three). The name, which was new to me, comes from a common requirement that customers return to the lot to make their loan payments. The high-interest-rate loans are usually for aging, high-mileage vehicles to people with ragged credit. The idea of the "pay here" is to provide ample opportunity for dealers to keep track of the car's--and customer's--whereabouts and to increase the likelihood of repayment by customers.

One year ago (almost to the day), Credit Slips discussed the repossession rates for auto title loans. Unlike buy here/pay here, auto title loans are not to purchase a car but require a person to pledge their car's ownership if a loan is not paid back. Adam Levitin came up with an estimated rate of 14-18% for repossession on auto title loans but emphasized how difficult it was to get such data. Surprisingly to me, the LA Times managed to get the buy here/pay here industry to not just share--but to gloat--about how this business model works. The key data: 1)  About 1 in 4 buyers default. 2) The dealerships make an average profit of 38% on each sale, more than double the profit margin of conventional retail car chains.

Occupy Wall Street, "Fringe Banking" and Public Options

I happened to walk by Zuccoti Park in Manhattan yesterday, where the Occupy Wall Street protest is centered. I picked up a few pieces of protester literature. I can't say that I was in any way comprehensive in my collection. Some of the literature was just nuts, e.g., a flier blathering about admiralty law usurping the common law and the Trading with the Enemies Act. This flier could just as easily have been found at a Tea Party gathering. It gave new meaning to the term "fringe banking." 

But I also picked up a thoughtful and intelligent, for example a flier about public banking and the Bank of North Dakota (the only state-owned bank in the United States).  Hmmm.  That sounds like a public option for banking. If the financial system is broken, maybe it needs some better competition. It's not such a crazy idea. We actually already do that quite a bit in the mortgage market-FHA, VA, RHS, Ginnie Mae, and historically the FHLBs, HOLC and Fannie Mae (Susan Wachter and I have a forthcoming book chapter on this, to be posted to SSRN soon). We've even done it in straight banking--most people forget that we used to have a U.S. Post Office Bank. We have an FDIC that used to compete with private bank insurance funds (see the opening chapters of Kathleen Day's S&L Hell for a description of the private Maryland S&L insurance fund that failed). And we have federal (public) currency that used to compete with and has now supplanted private bank notes.  My point here is not to endorse public options or not, but merely to note that historically they were a response to failed private markets and should be part of the policy discussion. 

Minnesota Attorney General Sues 5 Internet Payday Lenders for Automatically Extending Loans

The five lenders, Flobridge Group LLC, Silver Leaf Management and Upfront Payday, all of Utah; and Integrity Advance and Sure Advance LLC,  were each sued separately for violating Minnesota’s small loan laws.  The total U.S. market for Internet payday loans is estimated at $10.8 billion. These suits allege various violations, including automatic extensions of the loans and rolling the loans over by paying off an old loan with proceeds from a new one, as well as a failure to be licensed in the state.   The reporter who wrote this story  tried to call one lender and got a  voicemail system that kept looping back through the list of options after pressing "0" for "all other inquires." One of the options included pressing 3 "if you would like to extend your loan for another two weeks." A customer-service representative at Sure Advance LLC of Delaware asked for an inquiry to be sent to an email address. No response had arrived by late Tuesday.

Phone calls to one borrower, Diane Briseno's, home in Maplewood came from India, the Minnesota attorney general's office discovered. Her caller ID showed the call was from the State of Minnesota. Briseno's son, 20, had started applying for a loan online but never completed the form. Regardless, he had left enough information that the phone calls started almost immediately. When Briseno called back to a toll-free number, she was told her son had taken out a $700 loan and needed to pay $6,000 immediately.

Is it That Hard to Find a Good Payday Loan? One Woman Paid $900 in Undisclosed Fees

Following our prison visit in clinic this past week, we promised to report on a brand new (to us) scam, one involving a company that helps people “find” payday lenders. My student Bridget Mullins reports on it here.

One woman I saw at the prison had a question about a predatory lending scheme (if you can call it lending really) that I had never heard of before. She told me that she was looking for a payday loan so she went to a website that offered to find her a good payday loan. At some point she was asked to enter in her bank account info, but she didn’t read the fine print and she didn’t understand that they were actually charging her for this “service.” She never got a payday loan from this company, and it ended up costing her $900 in overdraft fees at her bank.  We have no idea how much the finder charged or how many times they ran these unauthorized fees through, so we tried to find out what might've happened.

Call for Papers on Regulation in the Fringe Economy

Jim Hawkins, Jean Braucher and I, put together a symposuim proposal on frindge banking products, and we were very fortunate to have Washington and Lee School of Law (home of the illustrous Professor Margaret Howard) accept our proposal. As a result, the law school is now making the follwing call for papers. 

The symposium Regulation in the Fringe Economy will be the most significant attempt to date by legal scholars to address the vexing legal and social issues created by lenders on the fringes of the economy who offer payday, auto title, for-profit college, and refund anticipation loans. A complete list of confirmed participants and their paper topics is available at the conference website: http://law.wlu.edu/fringe.

RALs - Will They Become Extinct?

Refund appreciation loans, or RALs, are among the priciest loan transactions out there.  Customers pay a fee (frequently 40% to 700% if expressed as an APR) to get their tax refund early.  The fees can be much higher.  I saw one where a consumer was owed a $4,000 tax refund, and paid $1,000 of that to a RAL provider, in order to receive the remaining $3,000 two weeks earlier than the customer otherwise would have.  In some parts of the country, for example in Indian Country, RALs seem like the only option.  This year I also saw a very well known tax preparers advertise FREE tax return preparation, only to find out they were actually providing high-fee RALs.  Not so free…..

But the RAL gravy train may be almost over.  The FDIC just ordered one of the last underwriters of the products to stop backing the controversial loans. The FDIC told Kentucky-based Republic Bank & Trust Co. that the loans are unsafe and unsound now that the IRS no longer offers banks its debt indicator, a tool loan providers used to determine whether a taxpayer had outstanding tax liabilities that could be garnished from a tax refund.