What's 43 Years Among Friends?

One of my recent blog posts took issue with the historical claims in a Supreme Court amicus brief filed by several eminent law professors in the Purdue Pharma appeal. One of the professors, Tony Casey at University of Chicago Law School, fired back with a comment, and I responded at length in the comments section, but I think the exchange is worth elevating to a stand-alone blog post. 

To recap, the good amici jumped all over my claim that the Framers could not have conceived of nonconsensual nondebtor releases as being within the scope of the Bankruptcy Power. To this end, they cited a couple of English cases from 1618-1620. My original post pointed out that these were not contemporaneously reported decisions; they remained unknown until 1932 when a modern scholar "reported" the cases from his own reassembly of various Chancery documents. Moreover, the decisions were not even bankruptcy decisions, but compositions, not operating under any bankruptcy statute. 

Professor Casey responded:  

I really don't understand the argument here. First, how can you say releases were "incomprehensible" to the framers given that Lord Bacon was granting them? Even if the opinion is unreported, I just can't see the leap to arguing that no one designing a judicial system could have thought of or comprehended this thing that the Lord Chancellor had done multiple times. Second, the point about these not being "bankruptcy" cases is semantic. These were part of compositions that look just like Chapter 11 cases today. Third, even if you are right about everything else, our main point was about your 1986 claim. You write this [in your blog post], "because there was no reported decision of these cases until 1932, they do not undercut the fact that Anglo-American bankruptcy law had no notion of nonconsenusal nondebtor releases in until 1986." How do you get from 1932 to 1986? Finally, we point out other historical pedigree including cases from the 1940s.

Okay. Let's try this again.

 

Something Doesn't Add Up in NY Times Article

The NYTimes has an article about how many consumers and small businesses have been getting their deposit accounts shut down and lines of credit cut off without explanation.

Something here doesn't add up. Banks have an obligation under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act and Regulation B thereunder to provide customers with "adverse action" notices if they terminate a line of credit. Those notices either have to provide an explanation of why or a notice of how the customer can get an explanation (for small businesses, that notice can be in the application itself). ECOA/Reg B apply not just to consumer credit, but business credit as well. Now, ECOA/Reg B does not cover deposit accounts, but if a bank cuts off both a deposit account and a line of credit, it would have to provide an adverse action notice about the line of credit.

So something here doesn't add up. Either banks have been failing to comply with ECOA or customers have checked their mail or haven't been forthright with the journalists. Large scale non-compliance with this sort of ECOA provision seems unlikely, as this is an easy-to-automate rule, where the cost-savings from noncompliance would be minimal. So, I suspect that something funny is going on on the consumer end, although, to be fair, an ECOA adverse action notice doesn't have to be particularly illuminating about why the bank took the adverse action.

ALI's Choice Architecture

I received a dunning notice from the American Law Institute today, reminding me that my dues were 90 days overdue. Now, you might conclude from this that I'm generally not paying my bills as they come due or that I'm a deadbeat by nature, but the truth is that I've been on the fence about whether I want to remain a member of the organization. That's another matter, however. My interest is that ALI had a default setting for me to make a $125 contribution in addition to my $125 dues.

In other words, the default setting was for me to pay 2x what I actually owe. The symmetry of the $125 numbers makes it much more deceptive because it seems more like an itemization and a total, rather than two separate charges.

To be sure, I could easily opt-out by unchecking the pre-checked box, and there's bolded language telling me about it (albeit in a visually separate box...), but is this sort of choice architecture really needed? I don't think it formally violates anything in the Restatement of Consumer Contracts, but opt-out mechanisms in consumer contracts just aren't a good look, any more than auto-renew features. If I want to give ALI an extra $125, I will, but I don't want to be tricked into doing so. Do better ALI.

What's 300 Years Among Friends?

It often doesn't end well when law professors play at being legal historians. The Purdue Pharma Supreme Court appeal is a case in point. 

A group of prominent bankruptcy law professors filed an amicus brief in support of the appellee, Purdue Pharma. Their brief takes direct aim at my amicus brief in support of the appellant, the United States Trustee. Specifically, the good professors challenge my claim that nonconsensual nondebtor releases were entirely unknown in Anglo-American law until the Johns Manville case in 1986. They write: 

One amicus has argued that releases would have been “incomprehensible to the Framers” and “were entirely unknown in American bankruptcy” prior to 1986. Adam J. Levitin Amicus Br. 4-5. This is a puzzling claim that misses the mark by at least 367 years.

Third-party releases have been known and comprehended in bankruptcy law as means to achieve global resolution since at least 1619, when the Lord Chancellor used his injunctive powers to release third-party sureties from the non-debtor claims in exchange for compelled contributions to a bankruptcy composition. See Tiffin v. Hart (1618-19), in John Ritchie, Reports of Cases Decided by Francis Bacon 161 (London 1932). Similar to the releases at issue in the present, the injunction in Tiffin was directed at dissenting creditors to facilitate a resolution that had been approved by the majority. Ibid.; see also Finch v. Hicks (1620), in Ritchie, Reports, at 166-167 (enjoining creditors from pursuing actions at common law against non-debtor sureties of an insolvent individual).

So, according to Purdue's amici, I'm wrong on the history because I failed to account for a 1619 case. But there's a HUGE problem with their argument...

The Section 1071 Small Business Lending Data Collection Rule

The Senate voted 53-44 to overturn the CFPB's section 1071 small business lending data collection rule under the Congressional Review Act. If the House can ever function, I'd expect that there are the votes there too to overturn the rulemaking, but it's all sort of a show given that President Biden is threatening a veto and there aren't the votes to override a veto.

So three thoughts on this. First, doing a CRA resolution that has no chance of passing is a huge waste of the most precious commodity in DC, namely Senate floor time. But perhaps that is the point. More time on CRA resolutions, less time available for confirming judges, etc. I'm surprised we don't see continuous filing of CRA resolutions as itself a delay tactic in the Senate.

Second, imagine for a second that the CRA resolution passed. The CFPB would be precluded from promulgating another rule that is "substantially the same" without new Congressional authorization. But section 1071 would still stand. Is there any way the CFPB could do any data collection rule that is not "substantially the same," in terms of requiring production by small business lenders of data about the borrowers and loans? If so, then it suggests that "substantially the same" must actually be quite narrowly construed (e.g., if rule 1.0 asked about LTV and rule 2.0 did not, they are not "substantially the same"), which has important implications for the CFPB's ability to undertake a new arbitration rulemaking.

Third, assuming that the resolution fails, we will then have data collection regimes for mortgages and small business loans. That data is important for monitoring against discriminatory lending. Doesn't it seem strange to limit the data collection to just those markets? Why not extend it to the most obvious market, where there have long been concerns about discriminatory lending, namely auto lending, as some have previously suggested?

Rite Aid Pulls a Purdue Pharma to (Sorta) Pick Its Judge

Last night I did a post about the Rite Aid bankruptcy. I assumed that the first affiliate to file was Lakehurst and Benson Corp. because that case had the lowest number of any case up on the public docket. But it seems that not all petitions had been posted to the public docket at that time, and instead the first to file was Rite Aid of New Jersey, Inc. (RANJ), which turns out to be a more interesting story than Lakehurst's petition.

Like Lakehurst, RANJ is a New Jersey corporation that is listed in NJ corporate records (both incorporation and UCC filings) as being based in Pennsylvania. So New Jersey venue is appropriate under the venue statute. But on its petition, RANJ, unlike Lakehurst, lists a principal place of business in New Jersey, specifically, "820 Beaverton Road, West Trenton, New Jersey 08628." That would seem to trigger the New Jersey local bankruptcy rules to have the case automatically assigned to one of the two judges in the Trenton vicinage.

But what happens when you plug that address into Google?  You get... nothing. Google does not know of a Beaverton Road anywhere in New Jersey.  Hmmm.

Google, however, in its artificial intelligence, does know of an "820 Bear Tavern Road, Ewing, New Jersey 08628." A look on the map indicates that Ewing is right next to West Trenton (and the post office doesn't actually care about the name of the town, just the ZIP...)

So it looks as if some Kirkland associate (do we really think Cole Schotz did the drafting?) had a bit of fauna mix up: "Beaverton" is actually "Bear Tavern".  If that's the case, what is actually at 820 Bear Tavern Road?  Well, it's the address of the Corporate Trust Company, a business that serves as the registered agent for other businesses.

You might be thinking at this point that Rite Aid is starting to look a lot like Purdue Pharma, where the White Plains venue was based on the address of the registered agent, not the actual business. (At least Rite Aid had the decency not to change registered agents in order to get a favorable address...)

Last time I checked, a registered agent is just an agent for service of process and the like. It is not a principal place of business, which is what matters for bankruptcy law: by definition the agent isn't the principal. In fact, RANJ has represented to the State of New Jersey that its principal business address is "30 Hunter Lane, Camp Hill, PA17001." And RANJ has made the same representation to the State of New York.

Now let's be clear: Rite Aid of New Jersey, Inc. is a New Jersey corporation, which means a New Jersey venue is technically proper, but the case should not have automatically been assigned to a Trenton judge under the NJ local rules, as there isn't any real claim for a Trenton vicinage. (It isn't clear how cases are assigned within a vicinage.) In any event, RANJ should have listed its actual Pennsylvania business address on its petition. If it had done so, it would not have had a 1 in 2 chance at getting Judge Kaplan, but would have had a 7 in 8 chance that the case would be assigned to another judge. And Kirkland no doubt knew what it was doing--someone made a deliberate decision to (mis)list the address of the registered agent as the principal place of business.

In short, this looks like yet another case of judge-picking. I recognize that parties are very hesitant to raise judge-picking before the picked judge, as it implies that at least the debtor thinks that the judge is not impartial. Nevertheless, I hope that there will be some probing questions about the judge-picking.

What's Rite Aid Doing in Trenton?

The big news this past week in bankruptcy was the resignation of Judge David R. Jones of the Southern District of Texas bankruptcy court after his romantic involvement with an attorney at Jackson Walker, who represented Chapter 11 debtors before him was revealed. That story is still unfolding (to be seen if there is bar discipline or even criminal charges), but let's not beat around the bush:  the real story is venue.

Specifically, the Jones scandal appears to go straight to the heart of Houston's meteoric rise as the premier Chapter 11 filing destination: Kirkland and Ellis would file large cases, sometimes with no obvious venue hook, in SDTX, where the cases would end up before one of two judges on a complex case panel:  Judge Jones or Judge Marvin Isgur, who was Jones's former law partner. In other words, file in Houston and you've got a 50% chance of getting Judge Jones, and even if you get Judge Isgur, the two judges worked very closely, mediating each others cases, for example.

Now that's all normal exploitation of the rules, but where a lot of questions emerge is from Kirkland having Jackson Walker as co-counsel. That's something Kirkland only did in Houston, meaning that Jackson Walker was really more like local counsel. It's quite strange as local counsel is not required under SDTX rules and, in any case, Kirkland has its own Houston office with restructuring partners. Other large firms filing cases in Houston have not had on local counsel. This story probably isn't over yet.

Now, having left a hot mess behind in Houston, now Kirkland is moving on...to Trenton, New Jersey, where once again there seems to be some venue funny business with Rite Aid

No Virginia, There Really Is No Such Thing as "the Fed"

Once again, the WSJ is publishing nonsense about the CFPB. It's really painful to see conservative admin law types write about federal agency structures when they don't understand the basic facts. The WSJ ran an op-ed by Adam White, a think-tanker at AEI and George Mason, that tries to take on the claim that if the CFPB's funding is unconstitutional, so is that of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. But Mr. White runs into trouble with his argument in his first paragraph when he refers to the "Federal Reserve" and "the Fed." The problem: there is no legal entity called "the Federal Reserve." We refer to it that way colloquially, but it's actually more complicated, and the complication really matters here. 

"The Fed" is actually "the Federal Reserve System," which consists of twelve private regional reserve banks and a federal government agency called the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Board is a full-fledged federal regulatory agency. It makes rules, engages in supervision of financial institutions, brings enforcement actions, and undertakes administrative adjudication. In short, it does all the same type of things as the CFPB.

CFPB v. Community Financial Services of America

With oral argument in CFSA v. CFPB scheduled for tomorrow, it's no surprise that some unfounded claims about the CFPB are getting thrown around by the usual anti-regulation suspects, like the WSJ editorial page and George Will. Given that there's more attention than usual being paid to the Bureau, I figure it's the least I can do to flag what's wrong about these claims. Specifically, I want to address the claim that the Bureau is some uniquely ultra-power federal agency and that its funding has "dual insulation" from Congressional control. 

Most Powerful Agency, Ever?

Is the CFPB really the most powerful government agency ever? Puhlease. Federal agencies aren't Pokemon cards with a CP level that can be compared, but even so, it's just ridiculous to claim that the CFPB is the most powerful federal agency around. Its ambit is noticeably narrower than that of the Federal Reserve Board, for example. (There's a reason that Jerome Powell, the Fed Chair, is a household name, while Rohit Chopra, the CFPB Director, is not.) 

Let's get the headline number up. There are 33 million businesses in the United States. The CFPB has some form of regulatory authority over only around 40,000 of them. That 40,000 consists of ~23,000 payday lenders, ~4,800 credit unions, ~4,600 banks ~4,500 debt collection agencies, ~500 nonbank auto lenders, and 410 consumer reporting agencies, and some sundry other entities.  In other words, only 0.1% of all businesses in the United States are under any CFPB jurisdiction (and even that is quite limited, as we will see). That fact alone should be the end to the "most powerful agency, ever," nonsense. 

Nondebtor Releases and the Future of Mass Torts

Certain members of the bankruptcy academy and bar seem to have their knickers in a twist over the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari to review the nonconsensual nondebtor releases in Purdue. Conventional wisdom is that SCOTUS is going to find that there's no statutory authority whatsoever for nonconsensual nondebtor releases outside of the asbestos context (expressio unius and Congress doesn't hide elephants in mouseholes....).

Let's be clear: nonconsensual nondebtor releases are not necessary to resolve mass tort cases.

Unhappy Campers and Their Credit Cards

This story about the failure of a company that ships duffel bags to/from sleep-away camps has an interesting payment systems meets bankruptcy angle that got me particularly excited given that I'm teaching payment systems this fall:

Parents are disputing the Camp Trucking fees with their credit card companies, but so far there haven’t been any resolutions. “We told them they’ll probably become creditors in a liquidation and get 20 cents on the dollar in five years,” said Mr. Aboudara [a camp network director].

Credit cards offer better purchase protection than any other payment medium, but it's not absolute, and this situation seems to fall into one of TILA's crevasses. 

Treasury in the Red... with Yellow

Freight company Yellow is on the verge of bankruptcy. It's not a company whose financial distress would normally stand out but for the fact that it received $700M in national security loans from the US Treasury in 2020, and, oh man, are taxpayers going to take it on the chin. 

The Treasury financing was one of a eleven of national security loans made as part of the CARES Act, and it accounted for 95% of the total dollar amount of those loans.  These weren't PPP loans, but were supposed to play a sort of analogous role, ensuring that companies critical to national security would be able to keep operating. There are really two loans from Treasury to Yellow:  a Tranche A loans and a Trache B loan. 

The Tranche A loan is for $300M and is secured by a junior lien on Yellow's accounts receivable, cash, and various other squishy stuff. Tranche B is for $400M and is secured by the vehicle fleet it financed—something like 1,100 tractors, 1,600 trailers, and 140 containers.  Both loans are cross-collateralized with each other, meaning that the collateral for Tranche A supports Tranche B and vice-versa. The Tranche A and Tranche B loans sit behind approximately $1B of pre-existing debt in the form of (1) a revolver that's secured by the accounts receivable and cash and (2) a term loan (Apollo) secured by Yellow's terminals and rolling stock (other than those financed by Tranche B). Treasury also took an approximately 30% equity stake in Yellow.

There's no way to sugar coat this:  Treasury's screwed on the Yellow loans.

Axos Bank--More Sketchiness?

The Washington Post has a big piece up about Axos Bank being the lender-of-last-resort for Donald Trump. But those us who work in the consumer finance space, know of Axos as a notorious bank partner in rent-a-bank arrangements. Axos is the bank parter of World Business Lenders, an outfit that charges small businesses incredibly high rates of interest (268%!), deceptively disclosed as daily percentage rates rather than annual rates. And of course these loans are backed by personal guaranties from the owners, so they are in many ways like consumer loans. 

Axos is a federal savings association, regulated primarily by the OCC, and headquartered in San Diego, California. So you'd think that Axos would only be able to export California interest rates, which would not in most circumstances allow for interest rates anywhere above 10% on business loans. But there's a set of OCC opinion letters from the 1990s that says that the relevant usury rate is the rate in the state in which the branch of the bank making the loan is located, not the location of the bank for chartering purposes. That's how Chase is an Ohio charter, but can charge Delaware rates. As for Axos, it claims that it makes its loans out of its Nevada branch, and Nevada law does not generally have a usury rate for written contracts, so Axos claims it can charge what it wants. 

The OCC opinion letters are only about national banks, not federal savings associations, which is an opening for the OCC, if it cared to do something about this problem. Plus, even for national banks, the opinion letters are hardly ironclad legal reasoning and could readily be repealed without notice-and-comment rulemaking. In other words, the OCC could solve rent-a-bank tomorrow if it wanted to do so. 

Putting aside the legal standard, the factual application of the OCC opinion letters to Axos seems sketchy. Axos's claim to be making the loans out of its Nevada branch, which is supposedly a "full service branch", but it's located on the 4th floor of a Vegas office park building that seems to generally be virtual offices and shared office space. (Does it remind anyone of the old trick of using a Westchester, NY, virtual office for getting bankruptcy venue in White Plains?) To be sure, there's an Axos sign on the building, but the 4th floor of an office park is a very strange place to locate a "full service branch"--it doesn't exactly invite walk-in business. Whether the loans are really being made out of the Nevada branch--meaning, I'd think, that the personnel involved in the underwriting are all in Vegas--is the sort of thing I would hope an OCC examiner would examine.... 

SEC Coinbase Suit

The SEC has finally brought its long-anticipated lawsuit against Coinbase. The suit alleges that Coinbase has operated as an unregistered securities broker, an unregistered securities exchange, and an unregistered securities clearing agency, and that it has made unregistered sales of securities, namely of its staking-as-a-service products. The litigation hinges entirely on one key question: are any of several tokens listed or products offered by Coinbase “securities.” If the tokens and products are not securities, then Coinbase has no problem. And if they are securities, Coinbase almost assuredly loses.

The Debt Limit Is Unconstitutional—But It's Not What You Think!

Anna Gelpern, Stephen Lubben and I have an article in The American Prospect entitled The Debt Limit Is Unconstitutional—but Not for the Reason You Think. Various commentators—and members of Congress—have suggested that the President “invoke the 14^th Amendment” to declare the debt limit unconstitutional. They're right to argue that the debt limit is unconstitutional, but the constitutional problem isn't the 14^th Amendment. Instead, it's Article I of the Constitution, namely Congress's power to enter into contracts. The tl;dr version is that Congress has a power to make binding commitments for the United States and the President is constitutionally obligated to perform those commitments. If the Treasury lacks the funds, then the President must borrow. No specific authorization is needed. Instead, it is implicit every time Congress appropriates funds to perform a binding commitment.

Relocating the constitutional problem with the debt limit isn't merely an academic exercise. It has two implications.

First, it changes the nature of the legal debate and puts the administration on much, much firmer legal footing. The 14th Amendment argument is weak because it simply is not a prohibition on defaulting. It's a prohibition on repudiation, and a default is not a repudiation. An Article I argument reframes the issue as being about the validity of the debt ceiling, rather than the ability to default. In other words, it goes to question of whether the House GOP has holdup power, rather than whether the administration is under some cryptic constitutional limitation that it must affirmatively "invoke."

Second, it means that the President not only can, but must disregard the debt limit in order to fulfill his own constitutional duty to "Take Care" that the laws are faithfully executed. In other words, breaching the debt limit is not merely an option, but a legal requirement if Treasury is short of funds. Once Congress has appropriated funds, the President must carry out the authorized spending.

Debunking Debt Ceiling Myths

The commentary on the debt ceiling standoff has featured a bunch of mistaken conceptions from across the political spectrum. Let's address them. 

Myth #1:  The 14th Amendment Prohibits a Default

A variety of commentators claim that the 14th Amendment prohibits the United States from defaulting. It does nothing of the sort. Read the text of the Public Debt Clause: 

The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned.

The Public Debt Clause is a prohibition on disputing the validity of US debt obligations--that is disputing whether they are legitimately owed. There's not a word in the 14th Amendment about default. The drafters of the Public Debt Clause included some very experienced commercial lawyers. They understood the difference between defaulting on an obligation and disputing or repudiating an obligation.  For example, I might acknowledge that I owe a loan, but just not be able to pay it. That's different than saying "I don't owe the money."

The Public Debt Clause is a prohibition on Congress, the Executive, and the Courts from disavowing US debt obligations. It's not a prohibition on defaulting because such a prohibition would be meaningless. If a country is unable to pay its obligations, no constitutional commitment device can change that. A constitution cannot fill a bare cupboard. And if a country is simply unwilling to pay its obligations (but admits to them), then its creditors are left with whatever legal recourse they might have. But prohibiting default doesn't get creditors anything. Prohibiting disavowal does because it means that creditors retain their right to be paid.

What all this means is that "invoking the 14th Amendment" is meaningless, unless it is shorthand for "treating the debt limit as unconstitutional." Now it just so happens that the debt limit is unconstitutional—but not because of the 14th Amendment!

 

Community Financial Services of America v. CFPB Amicus Brief

This fall the Supreme Court will be hear a case captioned Community Financial Services of America v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, dealing with the constitutionality of the CFPB's funding mechanism. I'm pleased to announce that Patricia McCoy and I filed an amicus brief today in support of the CFPB. We were very capably represented by Greg Lipper of LeGrand Law.

The tl;dr version: if the 5th Circuit's opinion is upheld it will result in market chaos--all of the CFPB's existing regulations will be void, and that includes things on which market actors rely, such as TILA disclosure safe harbors and ability-to-repay rule safeharbors. Moreover, there's no way to cabin the 5th Circuit's opinion to the CFPB--if the Bureau's funding is unconstitutional, so too is that of every federal banking regulator, including the Federal Reserve Board. There's simply no credible way to do a surgical strike on the Bureau's funding without collateral damage of economic havoc.

Calculation of Secured Claims

When I was a law student the rule I learned about secured claims was that they accrue post-petition interest and attorneys' fees (if provided for by contract or statute) up to the amount of the value of the collateral that exceeds their claims, but then nothing further once they are fully secured.  That was an easy enough rule to apply.

But then the Supreme Court's ruled in Travelers v. PG&E (2007) that the standard basis for disallowing the excess attorneys' fees—the Fobian rule—was no longer valid. SCOTUS expressly left open the possibility of other arguments for limiting attorneys' fees, but none have been successful in the courts of appeals so far. 

So this brings up a question:  If post-petition interest is capped by the collateral cushion, but post-petition attorneys' fees are not so capped and can therefore spillover into an unsecured claim, what is the order in which the collateral cushion is applied?  That is, what is the correct order of operations?  Is the collateral cushion applied first to post-petition interest and then to attorneys' fees or vice-versa or are they applied as they accrue? 

I'm curious for readers' thoughts on the right answer to this problem, or at least how it is handled in practice.  I'm also curious for thoughts on why the issue hasn't arisen in any reported decision. The problem seems akin to that of how adequate protection payments are applied to reduce a claim and collateral value, where there is a little bit of caselaw.  

LTL 2.0: The Largest Fraudulent Transfer in History

[Updated 4.12.23 to reflect the transcript of the first day hearing with much more detailed analysis of LTL's arguments regarding fraudulent transfer allegations.]

Today was the first day hearing for LTL 2.0. An ad hoc committee of talc claimants (most of the members of the Official Committee from LTL 1.0) weighed in with an informational brief that blasted the bankruptcy filing as being in bad faith and premised on what is, without hyperbole, the largest fraudulent transfer in history, weighing in a jaw-dropping $52.6 billion.

LTL, Part Deux (now with even more fraudulent transfers!)

This post is a joint post by Hon. Judith K. Fitzgerald (ret.)[*] and Adam Levitin

Here we go again. Precisely one hour and thirty-nine minutes after the dismissal of the bankruptcy filing of LTL, Johnson & Johnson’s artificially created talc-liability subsidiary, the company was right back at it again with the filing of a new chapter 11 case in New Jersey, again assigned to Judge Kaplan.

It took some fast work from our friends at Jones Day to get a second complex chapter 11 case out the door, albeit without any schedules! With the filing came, inter alia, a declaration, a statement by the Debtor regarding its second filing, and a new Adversary Proceeding that seeks the same preliminary injunctive relief for the benefit of some 700 J&J affiliates and favored customers that was achieved in the first LTL case.

The new case is supposedly engineered to comply with the strictures of the Third Circuit’s decision dismissing the original filing for not being in good faith on account of the debtor not being in financial distress. To recall, LTL found itself hoist on its own petard before the Third Circuit, which noted that its assets included a $62 billion funding agreement, vitiating any claim of financial distress.

To this end, what has changed in LTL 2.0 is the design of the funding agreement. The funding agreement in LTL 1.0 was for up to $62 billion, and the funding was to come from both LTL’s HoldCo (New JJCI) and J&J. Now in LTL 2.0, the funding agreement is just from HoldCo, and it is for only $8.9 billion. There is a proposed backstop from J&J, but that will require bankruptcy court approval, so LTL claims that it is not part of the good faith analysis. LTL’s thinking is that Judge Kaplan previously found that the HoldCo (or at least its predecessor) was in financial distress, so it must be so now, particularly because in January of this year it transferred most of its assets—the entire J&J consumer business!—to the J&J parent. The idea is that the new funding agreemen tisn’t really so valuable, so LTL must be in financial distress.

There are (at least) three flies in J&J's ointment.

It's Not Just an SVB Problem: the Systemic Nature of the Bank Regulation Failure

A mid-sized regional bank specializing in lending to tech start-ups, crypto companies, or law firms hardly seems of systemic importance, even if its failure would have caused disruption in some industries regionally and might have triggered a cascade of corporate bankruptcies because of large uninsured deposit balances. That sort of collateral damage from a bank failure is unfortunate and painful for those involved, but that's the nature of market discipline.

If that's where things ended with Silicon Valley Bank, I suspect regulators would have said too bad, so sad, as they were initially prepared to do. Yet the problem with Silicon Valley Bank's failure was that it had the potential spark for a banking-industry-wide panic, in which depositors pull their funds from smaller banks and move them either to big banks or to money market funds. That sort of panic could have been devastating to small and medium banks, as they would have faced a liquidity crunch that many could not meet...for the very same reason that SVB got into trouble, namely that they are sitting on large unrealized losses on their bond portfolios because they failed to manage interest rate risk appropriately. And if we had a correlated failure of lots of small and medium-sized banks, it would have resulted in serious economic disruption in small business and agricultural lending and a lot more spillover insolvencies of firms that had large uninsured deposits at those banks. That's the systemic risk scenario with SVB, and I suspect that as the weekend after the SVB failure advanced, that's what scared federal bank regulators into guarantying all deposits at SVB and SBNY.

But notice the nature of the problem: it wasn't just SVB that mismanaged its interest rate risk. It was lots and lots of other banks. Mismanaging rate risk is a Banking 101 screw-up, but it's also a Bank Regulation 101 screw-up. Rate risk is hardly a novel problem, and it's an easy one to address through derivatives like interest rate swaps, but those eat into profitability. Why bank regulators let rate risk get out of control almost across the board is something Congress needs to understand—I suspect that the story is much like consumer protection violations, which historically were tolerated because they were profitable. This much is clear, however:  if regulators had done their job generally, SVB's bank would not have posed systemic risk because there wouldn't have been the possibility of a panic. It would have been a one-off bank failure and nothing more. Regulators should have been on SVB's problems much sooner, but the real regulatory failure was an across-the-board failure to ensure that banks managed their rate risk because that's what set up the panic scenario.

Put another way, this isn't just a problem that can be hung on the neck of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. The problem here implicates every federal bank regulator.

FDIC's Poor Track Record in Holdco Bankruptcies

Last week I did a post about how the FDIC as receiver for Silicon Valley Bank probably doesn't have a claim against SVB Financial Group, the holdco of the bank. I got some pushback on that (including from a former student!), but I'm sticking to my guns here. It's a result that seems wrong and surprising, but if you look at the three most recent big bank holdco bankruptcies (this takes some digging in old bankruptcy court dockets), the FDIC has ended up with little or no claim.

SVB Financial Group's Manhattan Venue

As I have previously blogged, SVB Financial Group seems to be trying to do venue by declaration. Consider the grounds for venue under 28 USC 1408 and how they apply to SVBFG:  

• Location of principal place of business for majority of past 180 days.  All of SVBFG's regulatory filings in the last 180 days said its address—principal place of business—is in Santa Clara, CA.
• Location of principal assets for majority of past 180 day. The majority of its assets for the last 180 days—Silicon Valley Bank—were in Santa Clara.
• Location of domicile for majority of past 180 day.  SVBFG is incorporated in Delaware and always has been. 
• Location of pending affiliate's case's venue for majority of past 180 day. SVBFG does not have any affiliate cases pending, much less in SDNY.

SVBFG's claim to SDNY venue seems to be based on the location of its principal assets. Those principal assets are as of today the equity of two of its non-debtor subsidiaries. But for almost all of the past 180 days, the principal assets were the equity in the bank. Not only is SVBFG trying to ignore the 180 days rule (which exists precisely to prevent this sort of gaming), but its argument that its assets are located in NY is simply wrong.  

Both of the SVBFG subsidiaries are Delaware entities according to SVBFG's last annual report. The subsidiaries might have their principal offices in Manhattan, but that's irrelevant. The corporate stock is not located in Manhattan (I really hope they aren't suggesting that the DTC's holding of stock certificates does the trick--if so, everyone can file in Manhattan). When a parent owns a subsidiary's stock, the stock either has no location as an intangible or is located where the subsidiary is domiciled.  Nothing else makes sense.

To see why, consider the following: suppose a car is my principal asset. It's titled in Delaware, but currently illegally double-parked in Manhattan. In that case SDNY venue would be proper. There's direct ownership of a physical asset that has a location and that's enough for the venue statute. It's no different than owning a building in Manhattan. But now imagine that my principal asset is not the car, but stock in a Delaware corporation, and the corporation's sole asset is a car that's illegally double-parked in Manhattan. In this scenario, I do not directly own the asset that is in Manhattan. To impute it to me would render the venue statute meaningless.  Congress knows how to talk about indirect ownership when it wants. It didn't in the venue statute. The statute is about the principal assets of the debtor, not the debtor's non-debtor subsidiaries. Trying to bootstrap in this way is akin to LTL trying to bootstrap on non-debtor J&J's "distress." Bankruptcy law has clear boundaries—debtor vs. non-debtor—but if it's going to be ignored, then what are the "rules"? 

While I'm thumping on the venue issue, what of the "no harm, no foul" argument? I don't know what the harm is of SDNY venue at this point. This isn't an obvious issue like Boy Scouts going to Delaware to avoid 5th Circuit law on non-debtor releases. But I can say this with confidence: Sullivan & Cromwell clearly thought there was some benefit to their client in having SDNY venue, rather than Delaware or California venue. It's not that these other venues are somehow not equipped to handle a case like this (and notice how insulting that argument is to most of the 375 bankruptcy judges in the country...). Delaware and (Central District) of California have both done large bank holding company bankruptcies:  WaMu and IndyMac. Perhaps S&C simply doesn't want to take the Acela to Wilmington and stay at the Hotel Dupont, just as the California-based creditors don't want to fly out to LaGuardia. But it's also possible that there's some substantive legal issue S&C is concerned about that led it to file the case in SDNY. The very fact that the debtor ordered "off-menu" when there were two good, legitimate, alternative venue choices should set everyone's spidey sense tingling. I was pleased that the court has not put in "venue is proper" language in its orders so far; we'll have to see if there's an objection. That might turn on whether other parties can suss out a potential disadvantage to being in SDNY and want to risk the possibility that the judge takes umbrage with a venue motion, even if it's about governing law, rather than a question of getting a fair shake. 

The Death of Dodd-Frank: Banking Law's Dobbs Moment

Last year, I savored a bit of schadenfreude watching my con law scholar colleagues despair about their field after cases like Dobbs v. Women's Health Organization or West Virginia v. EPA. Con law scholars see themselves as the royalty of the legal academy, far above those folks who do blue collar law like bankruptcy and commercial law or grubby stuff like banking and money. And that's fine--we always laughed at them as slightly clueless toffs, not realizing (or wanting to admit) that their field is largely a battle of normative opinions, without any quasi-objective touchstone or clearly right or wrong answers. In contrast, we can point to things like express deadlines and numerical ratios that must be maintained and efficiency principles like "least cost avoider". That's what's made the Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence so delicious--it shows what every non-con law scholar has long known--that con law is as much politics as it is law. There was a certain joy in watching the con law field realize that the emperor had no clothes.  

But there's karma in the universe, and Silicon Valley Bank is sticking it right back the banking law scholars. I don't usually teach the core prudential regulation banking law class, but I really feel for colleagues who do. The response to Silicon Valley Bank is banking law's Dobbs moment. In 2010, in the wake of the 2008 crisis, Congress erected an enormous legal edifice to govern financial institutions--the Dodd-Frank Act. And we saw in the course of a weekend that it was all an expensive and wasteful Potemkin village. What good does it do to have a massive set of regulations...if they aren't enforced? To have deposit insurance limits...if they are disregarded? Dodd-Frank is still on the books, but its prudential provisions are as good as dead. Why should anyone follow its requirements now, given that they'll be disregarded as soon as they're inconvenient? And why should the public have any confidence that they are protected if the rules aren't followed? Indeed, did anyone even look at SVB's resolution plan or was it all a show? 

I really don't know how one can teach prudential banking regulation after SVB. How can you teach the students the formal rules—supervision, exposure and concentration limits, prompt corrective action, deposit insurance caps—when you know that the rules aren't followed? This is going to be a real challenge for folks who teach banking regulation. So, I invite our con law colleagues to snicker back at us. 

P.S. Anna Gelpern will say that I'm being naive--as she noted in a great 2009 article, the rules always get tossed out the window in financial crises and then there's a lot of finger wagging and new rules that are followed until the next crisis, when they aren't. And she's right. But the cycle of rules-crisis disregard-new rules had its own internal credibility:  this time I mean it! That internal credibility required there to be a certain time lag between crises, enough that a new king would arise over Egypt, who did not know Joseph, that is a new crew of regulators who could not be counted on to act the same way as in the past. When it's the same crew as from the last crisis, the internal credibility of "this time I mean it!" doesn't fly. 

SDNY: EFTA Applies to Crypto

I'm teaching cryptocurrency today in my Payment Systems class, and I'd been puzzling about why no one has applied the Electronic Fund Transfers Act and Reg E thereunder to crypto: after all, if you have a crypto account with an exchange, it would seem to be an "account" at a "financial institution" that is primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and is used for electronic transfers of "funds." In fact, I had just emailed Bob Lawless for a sanity check on this, when I came across a very recent SDNY decision that held that the EFTA applies to crypto. That's a huge consumer protection win. Reg E has important consumer protections regarding unauthorized transactions, error resolution, and provision of receipts and periodic statements. It also creates huge compliance headaches for crypto exchanges, which are not set up for dealing with any of those problems. All of the Zelle scam error resolution issues are now going to become crypto scam error resolution issues. And the ruling also indicates that consumer protection at cryptocurrency exchanges is now squarely within the existing regulatory authority of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. This could get interesting. 

The Regressive Cross-Subsidy of Uncapping Deposit Insurance

There's talk about removing the FDIC deposit insurance caps in response to the "Panic of 2023"®.  There's a refreshing realism about such a move. But let's also be clear about the distributional impact of such a move:  it's a huge cross-subsidy from average Joes to wealthy individuals and businesses.>

If FDIC insurance coverage caps are removed, banks will pay more in insurance premiums. They will pass those premiums through to customers because the market for banking services is less competitive than the market for capital. In particular, the higher costs for increased insurance premiums are likely to flow to the least price-sensitive and most “sticky” customers:  less wealthy individuals.  So average Joes are going to be facing things like higher account fees or lower APYs, without gaining any benefit. Instead, the benefit of removing the cap would flow entirely to wealthy individuals and businesses. This is one massive, regressive cross-subsidy. It's not determinative of whether raising the cap is the right policy move in the end, but this is something that should be considered.

The Financial Regulatory Credibility Problem

Financial regulation has a credibility problem. Actually, it's got two credibility problems.

It's not credible any more to think that financial regulators will shut down troubled institutions until they are forced to do so. And it's no longer credible that financial regulators will allow depositors to incur losses. Both are really problematic.

Oops. How the FDIC Guaranteed the Deposits of SVB Financial Group

When President Biden announced the rescue of Silicon Valley Bank depositors, he emphasized that "investors in the banks will not be protected.  They knowingly took a risk and when the risk didn’t pay off, investors lose their money.  That’s how capitalism works." Unfortunately, that's not how US law works. 

There seems to be a gap in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act that is going to protect some investors in Silicon Valley Bank’s holding company, SVB Financial Group. The holdco’s equity in the bank will be wiped out in the FDIC receivership, but the FDIC doesn’t have any automatic claim on the holdco. This is basic structural priority/limited liability:  creditors of a subsidiary have no claim on the assets of a parent.

What's worse is that the holdco, which filed for bankruptcy today, has substantial assets including around $2 billion on deposit with SVB. Almost all of that $2 billion deposit at SVB would have been uninsured, but by guarantying all the deposits, FDIC accidentally ensured that the holdco’s bondholders would be able to recover that from that full $2 billion deposit.

There isn't any provision in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act that subordinates the claims of insiders—like corporate affiliates or executives—that exceed the insured deposit limit to other creditors. So once FDIC guaranteed all deposits, it necessarily guaranteed the deposits of the holdco and other insiders. 

Who Knew Silicon Valley Was in Manhattan?

Silicon Valley Bank's holding company, SVB Financial Group, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy this morning...in the Southern District of New York. Who knew that Park Avenue South was in the heart of Silicon Valley?

Seriously, the venue here looks problematic. SVB Financial Group's petition lists its principal place of business as 387 Park Avenue South, Manhattan. There's a SVB location there with about 20,000 square foot of space. That's sure doesn't seem like a corporate headquarters for the 16th largest bank holding company in the US. Instead, it seems to be more of a bank branch. But the petition does bear the signatures, under penalty of perjury, of SVB Financial Group's CRO and, not so clearly under penalty of perjury, of SVB Financial Group's attorney at Sullivan & Cromwell. 

Curiously, SVB Financial Group has been telling federal bank regulators a different story about where it's located. On its Bank Holding Company Report, Systemic Risk Report, Consolidated Financial Statement, and Parent Company Only Financial Statement for Large Bank Holding Companies—documents filed with the Federal Reserve Board—SVB Financial Group said its address is 3003 Tasman Drive, Santa Clara, California. Hmmm.

What's Going on with First Republic Bank?

Following the failure of Silicon Valley Bank, a lot of other regionals have experienced depositor runs and serious pressure on their stock prices. But there's actually a lot of variation among regionals, and the solutions to SVB's problems don't necessarily fit the other regionals' problems, as the case of First Republic Bank shows.

Why Weren't Silicon Valley Bank Depositors Using CDARS?

Silicon Valley Bank seems to have had large amounts of uninsured deposits from businesses and high net worth individuals. And those uninsured deposits are likely to be impaired in the receivership, meaning that they will not get paid 100 cents on the dollar whenever they do get paid.

But here's the thing:  there are turnkey products that enable depositors to insure much, much larger amounts than the FDIC-insurance cap of $250k/depositor/account type. For years and years there's been deposit brokerage services that spread out deposits at multiple banks, all in amounts under the FDIC insured cap. The best known service is called CDARS-Certificat of Deposit Account Registry Service. It's offered by IntraFi (formerly Promontory). I don't know if SVB participated in CDARS, but it's a pretty straightforward solution to the deposit insurance cap.

What Could Go Wrong When a DIP Maintains a Large, Uninsured Deposit Account at Silicon Valley Bank?

You gotta feel for BlockFi customers. First, they find themselves creditors in BlockFi's bankruptcy. And now they've found out that BlockFi had a large, uninsured deposit...at Silicon Valley Bank. Yup, it seems that BlockFi had $227 million in a money market deposit account at SVB. (The UST refers to it as a "money market mutual fund," but that cannot be right, or it wouldn't be at SVB or have any insurance. [See "Another update" below regarding possibility that it was a money market mutual fund sweep account, in which case the money would in fact be protected.]) That would mean there's a $226.75 million uninsured deposit. Given what we know about SVB, part of that $226.75 million in uninsured funds is likely lost if it's still at SVB.  

The US Trustee filed a motion today to force BlockFi to put the funds in insured accounts, but it sure looks as if the cow's out of the barn already. If the money's lost, then the question is who's going to pay for this screw up, and it's especially juicy because it's all tied up with venue competition. 

The Texas Two-Step's New Key

In the wake of the Third Circuit's LTL Management decision many commentators wrote off the Texas Two-Step as dead. Turns out it's not, it's just playing out in a different key with a new filing in SDTX.

The New Usury

I have a new paper up on SSRN. It's called The New Usury: The Ability-to-Repay Revolution in Consumer Finance. It's a paper that's been percolating a while--some folks might remember seeing me present it (virtually) at the 2020 Consumer Law Scholars Conference, right as the pandemic was breaking out. Here's the abstract:

Consumer credit regulation is in the midst of a doctrinal revolution. Usury laws, for centuries the mainstay of consumer credit regulation, have been repealed, preempted, or otherwise undermined. At the same time, changes in the structure of the consumer credit marketplace have weakened the traditional alignment of lender and borrower interests. As a result, lenders cannot be relied upon not to make excessively risky loans out of their own self-interest.

Two new doctrinal approaches have emerged piecemeal to fill the regulatory gap created by the erosion of usury laws and lenders’ self-interested restraint: a revived unconscionability doctrine and ability-to-repay requirements. Some courts have held loan contracts unconscionable based on excessive price terms, even if the loan does not violate the applicable usury law. Separately, for many types of credit products, lenders are now required to evaluate the borrower’s repayment capacity and to lend only within such capacity. The nature of these ability-to-repay requirements varies considerably, however, by product and jurisdiction. This Article collectively terms these doctrinal developments the “New Usury.”

The New Usury represents a shift from traditional usury law’s bright-line rules to fuzzier standards like unconscionability and ability-to-repay. While there are benefits to this approach, it has developed in a fragmented and haphazard manner. Drawing on the lessons from the New Usury, this Article calls for a more comprehensive and coherent approach to consumer credit price regulation through a federal ability-to-repay requirement for all consumer credit products coupled with product-specific regulatory safe harbors, a combination that offers the greatest functional consumer protection and business certainty.

Impact of the Illinois Predatory Loan Prevention Act

In 2021 Illinois passed its Predatory Loan Prevention Act (PLPA), which imposes a 36% military APR (MAPR) cap on all loans made by non-bank or credit union or insurance company lenders. Not surprisingly, the law has not been popular with higher cost lenders who either have to change their offerings, cease doing business in Illinois, or figure out some way to team up with a bank that won't run afoul of the law's anti-evasion provision. 

Recently, opponents of the PLPA have been making some noise, pointing to a study by a trio of economists—J. Brandon Bollen, Gregory Elliehausen, and Thomas Miller—about the impact of the PLPA. (The latter two are familiar scholars whose work consistently takes a dour view of consumer finance regulations: readers might recall my debunking of another recent study by Professor Miller, co-authored with Todd Zywicki, that was fundamentally flawed because of the miscalculation of loan caps in various states.)

Using credit bureau data, the Bollen et al. paper finds that the PLPA resulted in a 30% decrease in the number of unsecured installment loans to Illinois subprime borrowers and a 37% increase in the average installment loan size to Illinois subprime borrowers, which they attribute to the difficulty in making smaller loans profitable at 36% MAPR. Additionally, based on a lender-administered survey of 699 online borrowers (not necessarily of installment loans), the Bolen paper also reports a decline in borrower financial well-being following passage of the PLPA. 

Unfortunately, the Bollen paper suffers from serious data and methodological problems such that it does not tell us anything meaningful about the wisdom of the PLPA. Here's why. 

The Texas Two-Step's Liquidation Problem

This post is a joint post by Hon. Judith K. Fitzgerald (ret.)[*] and Adam Levitin

The Texas Two-Step has been the latest fad in mass tort bankruptcies, used, among others, by Johnson & Johnson, Georgia-Pacific, and, in a variation, 3M. The essential elements of the Texas Two-Step are the segregation of the debtor's mass tort liabilities in a non-operating subsidiary, which then enters into a funding agreement with the parent company to cover the mass tort liabilities up to some level. The subsidiary then files for bankruptcy and seeks to have the court stay the mass tort litigation against the non-debtor parent. If this maneuver is successful, the non-debtor parent goes about its normal business,[1] as do all of its creditors ... other than the mass tort victims. Meanwhile, the non-operating debtor subsidiary—whose sole creditors are mass tort victims—just sits in bankruptcy indefinitely.

The basic strategy behind a Texas Two-Step is “delay to discount”: the extended delay of the bankruptcy process pressures tort victims and their counsel to accept discounted settlement offers. The non-debtor parent feels no urgency for the bankruptcy to end because litigation is stayed against it. Moreover, the parent is able to continue its normal operations without being subject to bankruptcy court oversight or even to the regular expenses of defending the mass tort litigation. And because the debtor is a non-operating entity, it is under no pressure to emerge from bankruptcy. The debtor and its parent are both happy to let the bankruptcy drag on as long as necessary. In other words, the Texas Two-Step is an underwater breath-holding contest where the debtor has a snorkel. 

The ultimate end-game in a Texas Two-Step bankruptcy, however, is obtaining releases for the non-debtor parent (and other affiliates), bolstered by a channeling injunction that precludes tort victims from bringing suit against the parent and affiliates after the bankruptcy. There’s a fly in the ointment, however. A channeling injunction under section 524(g) requires that the debtor receive a discharge, and the debtor entity in the traditional Texas Two-Step case is not eligible for a discharge because it is a non-operating corporate entity that will be liquidating.

The Financial Inclusion Trilemma

I have a new draft article up on SSRN. It's called The Financial Inclusion Trilemma. The abstract is below. 

The challenge of financial inclusion is among the most intractable policy problems in banking. Despite being the world’s wealthiest economy, many Americans are shut out of the financial system. Five percent of households lack a bank account, and an additional thirteen percent rely on expensive or predatory fringe financial services, such as check cashers or payday lenders.

Financial inclusion presents a policy trilemma. It is possible to simultaneously achieve only two of three goals: widespread availability of services to low-income consumers; fair terms of service; and profitability of service. It is possible to provide fair and profitable services, but only to a small, cherry-picked population of low-income consumers. Conversely, it is possible to provide profitable service to a large population, but only on exploitative terms. Or it is possible to provide fair services to a large population, but not at a profit.

The financial inclusion trilemma is not a market failure. Rather it is the result of the market working. The market result, however, does not accord with policy preferences. Rather than addressing that tension, American financial inclusion policy still leads with market-based solutions and soft government nudges and the vain hope that technology will somehow transform the fundamental economics of financial services for small balance deposit accounts and small dollar loans.

This Article argues that it is time to recognize the policy failure in financial inclusion and give more serious consideration to a menu of stronger regulatory interventions: hard service mandates that impose cross-subsidization among consumers; taxpayer subsidies; and public provision of financial services. In particular, this Article argues for following the approach taken in Canada, the EU, and the UK, namely the adoption of a mandate for the provision of free or low-cost basic banking services to all qualified applicants, as the simplest solution to the problem of the unbanked. Addressing small-dollar credit, however, remains an intractable problem, largely beyond the scope of financial regulation.

Karens for Hire

The Washington Post has an article about a new business, "Karens for Hire," that is basically a way to hire a customer service advocate. Having spent way too much time with customer service of late, the article really hit a nerve. It gets at the central problem of consumer law, namely that the dollar amounts at issue in almost every dispute are way too small to litigate. Instead, consumers have to work through customer service and hope that they receive some sort of resolution, but that's a process that imposes substantial transaction costs (wait times, e.g.) and in which the consumer has no guaranty of a positive resolution, even if the consumer is in the right. 

There's some level of reputational discipline on companies with bad customers service, but it's pretty weak and indirect: when was the last time you investigated a company's customer service reputation before making a purchase? 

There are a few attempts to regulate customer service of which I am aware—TILA/EFTA error resolution procedures and RESPA loss mitigation procedures—but there's no general system of public regulation. Figuring out exactly what, if anything, would work as a more general solution to ensuring fair and efficient resolution of customer service calls remains one of consumer law's great challenges. 

Alex Jones's Bankruptcy

Alex Jones filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy himself today. So what is Mr. Jones hoping to accomplish with the bankruptcy filing? I see three possible goals, but I'm skeptical that he'll achieve more than one of them.

First, by filing for bankruptcy, Jones buys himself a bit of time and breathing space. The automatic stay stops all litigation and collection activity against him. It's not indefinite, but it takes the heat off for a bit. That might help him avoid any collection activities by the Sandy Hook victims' families while his motions for a new trial and remittur are pending.  (As far as I can tell, the Connecticut 20-day post-judgment window for appeal has run, but I guess these are not "appeals" since they are motions to the same court?)

Second, the bankruptcy filing moves the action from Connecticut to a Texas bankruptcy court. Jones might be hoping he finds the bankruptcy court more favorably inclined. I'm skeptical. If his behavior in the bankruptcy court matches how he's behaved in other courtrooms, he's not going to find the judge very sympathetic.

Third, Jones will be looking to get a discharge of his debts—including the Sandy Hook defamation judgment. If a debt is discharged, it cannot be collected after the bankruptcy; the creditor gets only what it is able to collect as part of the bankruptcy process. That would mean that Jones's future income would be free from the creditor's claim; only his present, non-exempt assets would be available for repaying creditors. While those present assets include (I presume) all of the IP of the Jones empire (by virtue of his ownership of the companies that hold them), Jones might have concluded that salvaging his current assets are a lost cause and that he'd do best to focus on freeing up his future income. 

The hitch here is that there is an exception to the bankruptcy discharge for "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another or the property of another." If the behavior that produced the Sandy Hook judgment was "willful and malicious," then Jones will not be able to protect his future income through bankruptcy.  While the Sandy Hook judgment was for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and unfair trade practices—things that sound willful and malicious—it was a default judgment, meaning that there was never any actual hearing of the merits of the case; Jones just didn't respond to the suit. If there is a discharge objection raised (as there surely will be), then Jones will have a chance to litigate not the actual judgment, but the "willful and malicious" issue, but that effectively means he has an opportunity to litigate the case he previously forfeited. I'm skeptical that he'll prevail (he certainly loses on willful, but maybe he's got a shot at malicious?), but he at least gets another roll of the dice.

Now this extra dice roll isn't risk free. By filing for bankruptcy, Jones will have to come clean about all of his current assets. If he fails to do so, he risks federal prosecution for bankruptcy crimes.  Additionally, while Jones has filed for Chapter 11, where the default setting is that the debtor retains control of his assets as a debtor in possession, there is the possibility of the appointment of a trustee to take over his assets. There will surely be a motion made for the appointment of a trustee given allegations of Jones hiding assets. Jones will get to fight the motion, but I think a trustee being appointed is a real likelihood. If a trustee is appointed, the trustee will act to avoid various pre-bankruptcy transfers made by Jones in an attempt to shield his assets (and if there is no trustee appointed, then a creditors' committee will seek authorization to do so). Either way, I cannot imagine that Jones will be able to retain effective control of the case for very long. 

Bankruptcy offers Jones a glimmer of hope--maybe he can get a discharge for the Sandy Hook verdict, if the court finds his behavior wasn't willful and malicious--but if I were a betting man, I wouldn't put my money on Jones. Yet as long as he comes clean to the bankruptcy court about his assets, etc., there's little downside to him for trying this last Hail Mary move to stave off the Sandy Hook creditors.