The Crisis of Fake Constraints: Greek Denouement Eupdate

Unless Greece and its creditors reach a deal in the next few days, Greece has no money to pay €15 Billion or so due to its bondholders in March.

From the start, this has been a crisis of fake legal and economic constraints masking very real political constraints. In 2010, Greece could have restructured its debt quicker than most sovereigns in modern memory -- or it might have been bailed out, had Europe chosen to go the route of fiscal transfers. Neither of these paths was taken because the European Central Bank was unwilling to countenance the sin of debt restructuring, but member states with money were unwilling to pay for the appearance of collective virtue.

Now that the restructuring is inevitable and the virtue bill unpayable, the fake constraints are back. The ECB holds about €50 of Greek debt, which must go into the restructuring to get enough debt and cashflow relief. But the central bank would not take losses, and remains allergic to triggering credit default swaps (which is more likely to happen if it sits out). Worse, its votes might be needed to (credibly threaten to) amend Greek bonds using retrofit Collective Action Clauses. (See latest from Gulati-Zettelmeyer here.)

There seems to be a simple fix: swap the Greek bonds held by the ECB for bonds of the European Financial Stability Facility at a price that does not cause ECB losses. Then have the EFSF go into the exchange and vote the bonds if it needs to. At a minimum, this captures for Greece the discount at which the ECB bought its bonds. If Europe is unwilling to see the EFSF take a loss from the ECB's purchase price, Greece could conceivably make up the difference with a special bond issue for the EFSF on terms that reflect the specialness of the vehicle and the circumstances.

Freshly downgraded, EFSF debt is not exactly in high demand. An ECB swap would not require it to raise money in the markets. Having a fiscal vehicle take the risk (if not the loss) from a Greek restructuring is more honest and institutionally sensible than leaving it with the monetary authority. At a minimum, it would stop the chatter about monetizing the debt--without the optics of a big new package for Greece.

As precedent, the operation might be healthy for all involved. An EFSF swap would signal the parameters for any future deals involving ECB-held debt: on the one hand, it is not fully preferred, on the other hand, there is a built-in limit to the haircut. There is even a whiff of harnessing the market. (I once heard a story that Latin American debt managers in pre-Brady days had made up "Capture the Discount" t-shirts.)

More broadly there is a decent argument that the EFSF is sui generis--an ad hoc crisis vehicle that can do what no one else can be expected to do. For example, it has never been encumbered by feckless claims of preferred creditor status, unlike the new treaty-based European Stability Mechanism, due out this summer. This is as close as it gets to a credible "just this once".

There is an argument that under some version of best market practice for CACs, EFSF should not be allowed to vote its Greek bonds in an exchange, because Greece is among its shareholders. I think this objection is surmountable, to the extent the EFSF is not controlled by and does not answer to Greece. Here is some analogous reasoning.

All this to say, wait for the next fake constraint to derail what could be a palatable solution to a horrible situation, followed by more suffering for all.