86 posts categorized "Economic Perspectives"

(More on) Sticky Shipping Contracts

posted by Mitu Gulati

A few days ago, I put up a post about a very interesting recent article by Richard Kilpatrick on highly sticky (and inefficiently so) shipping contracts. The focus of Richard's article was on the failure of these standard-form ship contracts to pre-specify the allocation of financial responsibility among the various parties (ship owner, chartering party, etc.) when refugees need to be picked up and the ship's pre-planned journey gets diverted. Refugees needing to be rescued at sea has, as we know, become a huge international issue over the last couple of years.  In that post, I wondered aloud about what the explanation for the stickiness in the ship contracts might be. Theory, after all, would suggest that in a market with highly sophisticated repeat players, inefficient contract clauses would get reformed quickly -- yet they do not. Richard, whom I had never corresponded with before this, was kind enough to send me his thoughts on the question. With his permission, since his thoughts on this are fascinating -- especially the bit at the bottom about how these same parties are simultaneously highly innovative (with ship technology) and highly conservative (with contracts) -- I'm reproducing them below.

From Richard:

I’ve thought about these same questions over the past months and certainly agree that there is a more work to be done in understanding and exposing why there is continued reliance on these antiquated contract forms. In the charterparty context, this is especially surprising given that new iterations of similar forms have been promulgated by the same organization (BIMCO) that drafted the ‘46 form. One answer that invariably comes up is that the shipping industry is deeply conservative and resistant to change. At a recent Singapore Shipping Law Forum, a bunch of us legal and industry people discussed this phenomenon in the context of international conventions on carriage of goods. The Hague Rules governing bills of lading were drafted in the 1920’s (and revised very minimally in the 1960’s via the Visby amendments). These rules desperately need updating because containerization and multimodalism has completely changed the shipping landscape. The subsequent "Hamburg Rules" largely failed. And while the recently drafted "Rotterdam Rules" attempt to rectify some of these problems, they are already viewed by some observers as unlikely to catch-on. Only 4 countries have ratified them so far (including Cameroon in Oct 2017): http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/transport_goods/rotterdam_status.html .

At least in part, this appears to be because the industry folks, including their fancy shipping lawyers, don't like change. Note also that the shipping industry is constantly evolving in other ways, particularly in its reliance on technology. Larger and more sophisticated vessels are constantly entering the market, and ports (as well as the vessels themselves) are increasingly being operated by computers rather than traditional labor. So I think it is fair to say there is a very traditional view towards regulation and liability allocation, but a relatively innovative approach towards operations. This creates an increasingly widening gap between the legal framework and the realities of business practice.

Why is Netflix Listing its European Bonds on the Isle of Guernsey?

posted by Mitu Gulati

Netflix has long interested me as a company, not only because of shows like "Master of None" (Aziz Ansari and Alan Yang have delivered brilliantly), its darwinian management philosophy (very cool podcast on Planet Money), but because of its uncertain future. It is competing against rich giants like Amazon and Apple to deliver original content in a field that is getting increasingly crowded.  My guess is that it is having to spend more and more on content, but is unable to increase its prices very much. One solution for Netflix: borrow at a high interest rate from investors who are willing to bet on your future.  And that it has done, in spades. Most recently -- a few days ago -- it borrowed $1.6 billion (yes, billion). I was intrigued and trying to avoid doing my real work, so I went looking for its offering documents and while I didn't immediately find the current docs, I found the offering circular for the bond issue Netflix did a few months prior in Europe (Euro 1.3 billion) in an offering listed on the International Stock Exchange, which is an exchange licensed by the Bailiwick of Guernsey.  Yes, really. So, surely, at least some of you are asking the same questions I am. What? Where? Who?

Guernsey, for those of you who are clueless like I am, is a British Crown "dependency" (not sovereign, but not independent, and not quite like a former colony like the British Virgin Islands or Bermuda (they are "British Overseas Territories")). Basically, a cynic might say: Perfect for a tax haven. But it is the stock exchange that interested me, especially since it seems to have been quickly rising in popularity for US and EU companies over the last couple of years.

If I remember my basic corporate finance class (I don't), we were told that exchanges performed a monitoring and disciplinary role; they were "gatekeepers", as the fancy corporate types liked to say. So, is Netflix going all the way to the Isle of Guernsey to get extra special monitoring from the Channel Islanders? Curious, I went to the website for the Guernsey exchange, to see what it said. And it does say that it has wonderfully rigorous regulatory standards ("some of the highest regulatory standards globally"). But does it really?

Continue reading "Why is Netflix Listing its European Bonds on the Isle of Guernsey?" »

Rights of Secured Creditors in Chapter 11: New Paper

posted by Melissa Jacoby

ABITed Janger and I have posted a paper of interest to Credit Slips readers called Tracing Equity. We still have time to integrate feedback, so please download it and let us know what you think.

As the image accompanying this post suggests, the project was inspired in part by recommendations of the American Bankruptcy Institute's Chapter 11 Commission. Discussion of those proposals starts on page 51 of the PDF.

One of the main insights of Tracing Equity is that both Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Code distinguish between (1) lien-based priority over specific assets and their identifiable proceeds, and (2) unsecured claims against the residual value of the firm. By our reasoning, even attempts to obtain blanket security interests do not give secured lenders an entitlement to the going-concern and other bankruptcy-created value of a company in chapter 11. We explain why our read of the law is normatively preferable and, indeed, is baked into corporate and commercial law more generally--part of a large family of rules that guard against undercapitalization and judgment proofing.

Looking forward to your thoughts.

 

 

Could Giving the Rohingya Refugees a Debt Claim Ameliorate the Current Crisis?

posted by Mitu Gulati

From Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati

Just a couple of weeks ago, the plight of the Rohingya, a muslim minority group in Myanmar, who are being oppressed (to put it mildly–they have been called “the most friendless people in the world”) was front page news. But, as has often been the case with the plight of the Rohingya over the years, news of their plight quickly receded as other human drama and tragedy took over (hurricane in Puerto Rico, Las Vegas shooting, Catalan secession vote/violence, North Korean craziness etc.)

We realize that we are likely engaged in a pointless task.  But we want to plead for the condition of the Rohingya, and indeed other refugees, not to be forgotten so quickly. As a threshold matter, we recognize that our government cannot be depended on to care much (if at all) about the plight of oppressed groups that are as far away, foreign and poor as the Rohingya. In other words, the top down mechanism isn’t going to work. The question then is whether, assuming that the oppression in question is clear and cognizable, there is some other solution—something bottom up--that the international legal system could provide to oppressed groups who are forced into refugee status that does not depend on other governments, such as the U.S., having a self interest in intervening.

Continue reading "Could Giving the Rohingya Refugees a Debt Claim Ameliorate the Current Crisis? " »

Everything You Wanted to Know About Bond Workouts But Were Afraid to Ask

posted by Adam Levitin

There's a great new paper available on out-of-court restructuring and the Trust Indenture Act.   The New Bond Workouts is up on SSRN.  From the abstract it sounds pretty darn amazing—a new, empirically based analysis of bond restructurings that rediscovers a long-forgotten intercreditor duty of good faith: 

Continue reading "Everything You Wanted to Know About Bond Workouts But Were Afraid to Ask" »

Two Books About Selling Math and Its Consequences for Inequality

posted by Pamela Foohey

EconomismOver at Consumer Law & Policy Blog, Jeff Sovern recently discussed James Kwak's new book, Economism: Bad Economics and the Rise of Inequality, which mounts a convincing case against the blind application of Economics 101 to important policy questions, such as healthcare, international trade, the minimum wage, mortgages and other financial products, and taxes. Kwak details the consequences of "economism," which he defines as "the belief that a few isolated Economics 101 lessons accurately describe the real world." Kwak analogizes using economics in this way to justify widening socioeconomic inequality to prior century's reliance on religion and applications of Darwinian evolution to justify the social order of those times. Part of the lure of economism, and how it can be used as an effective justification, is that it seemingly is grounded in math. And math appears to many as absolute, complicated, and scary. 

Weapons of Math DestructionWhich made me think of another relatively new book, Cathy O'Neil's Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy. O'Neil chronicles the repercussions of relying on algorithms fed by big data to assess everything from grade school teachers' effectiveness to credit worthiness to which households politicians should target during election campaigns. When not used properly, these "weapons of math destruction" can entrench and perpetuate inequality.

Continue reading "Two Books About Selling Math and Its Consequences for Inequality" »

Civil Rights and Economic Justice in a New Era

posted by Melissa Jacoby

FlyerSharing news of this post-election civil rights conference on December 2, 2016 that, notably for Credit Slips, features pathbreaking research by Professors Mechele Dickerson and Bob Lawless (in collaboration with Dov Cohen and the late Jean Braucher) on the intersection of race with debt and bankruptcy and an exploration of how this research informs policymaking and advocacy going forward. Time permitting, I will address a different intersection between race and debt: collecting judgments arising from police misconduct when cities file for bankruptcy. Thanks to Professor Ted Shaw and the Center for Civil Rights for recognizing the role debtor-creditor research can play in the quest for equality. 

Register using this link.

 

Does Behavioral Economics Matter?

posted by Adam Levitin

The New Republic (yes it still exists) has a piece about whether behavioral economics will have as much influence in a Clinton administration as it did in the Obama administration. The unspoken assumption of the piece is that behavioral economics actually had a big influence in the Obama administration. Here's the thing:  as far as I can tell, behavioral economics has been basically irrelevant in the Obama administration.

Yes, Cass Sunstein was the head of OIRA for part of the Obama administration. But when Sunstein went on a post-administration victory lap giving talks at a bunch of law schools (including at Georgetown), it was notable how few concrete examples he could give of the influence of behavioral economics on policy. There is, to be sure, an executive order suggesting that agencies subject to the order consider behavioral implications in their rulemakings, but the only concrete example Sunstein had was the transformation of the food pyramid into a food plate. (If you missed that change, well, you aren't the only one.) It's not entirely clear to me what great behavioral implication is from going from a pyramid to a plate, much less how much influence it had on how anyone eats.  There are, apparently, a bunch of other behaviorally-influenced moves according to a recent White House report.  But man, they are really small bore improvements on the margins (e.g., calling unemployed workers "job seekers" rather than "claimants"). If this is the highwater mark for behavioral economics, then it has truly fizzled as a policy move.  

Continue reading "Does Behavioral Economics Matter?" »

Credit Slips Presents: A Virtual Symposium on Puerto Rico

posted by Melissa Jacoby

TablePuerto Rico debt restructuring legislation is flying fast and furious around Congress. But the air contains more than a whiff of defeatism regarding the prospects of passage. Bills vary greatly in substance and scope, and yet apparently the response of powerful creditors is consistent: they want to retain the right to be holdouts and are making that position perfectly clear to our elected representatives.

Credit Slips contributors are no strangers to anti-restructuring advocacy, whether framed as moral hazard or otherwise. To that end, we embark on a virtual symposium inspired by the following question: What could the Executive Branch do to facilitate the restructuring of government debt in Puerto Rico absent Congressional action? 

On tap to brainstorm around this theme in the next two weeks are (in alphabetical order): Anna Gelpern, Melissa Jacoby, Bob Lawless, Adam Levitin, Stephen Lubben, Katherine Porter, John Pottow, Mark Weidemaier, and Jay Westbrook.

Continue reading "Credit Slips Presents: A Virtual Symposium on Puerto Rico" »

Is There a Student Loan Debt Crisis?

posted by Adam Levitin

I've been a skeptic for some time about claims that we have a student loan "crisis" in the United States. For individuals mired with student loan debt, it is very much a crisis, of course.  But my reluctance to term growing levels of student loan debt a crisis reflects the fact that student loan debt is highly concentrated within the population and is generally structured in a way that does not create sharp liquidity crises:  long (and often deferrable) maturities, no sharp repayment shocks, and often offers established repayment and forgiveness programs. (This is more true of government loans than private loans.) And, while student loan debt is growing rapidly, it is still only about a 9th of the size of the mortgage market. All of this has kept the student loan kettle from boiling over.  

Yet at the same time it is precisely because of the concentration of student loans in the younger population that it is concerning.  Large debt loads at the beginning of one's adult life are likely to have very different effects on than debt spread out over a life time.  Moreover, student loans are not incurred based on current income, but on assumptions of future income (if that), so student loan debt burdens are more likely to be poorly calibrated to borrower's actual earning capacity. Additionally, because student loan debt is not dischargeable in bankruptcy (except in extreme circumstances), unlike other types of debt, it likely to stick around.  And, unlike various types of secured debt, there is no "put" option. A homeowner who runs into trouble with a mortgage or a cash-strapped auto loan borrower can always sell the house or car (or let them be repossessed) to pay off part or all of the debt. That's not possible with unsecured debt.  

The real concern with student loans is not an acute liquidity crisis, like a mortgage payment resets or a massive surge in defaults, as with underwater homeowners.  Instead, the systemic danger from student loans is a debt overhang problem in which consumers' consumption habits are altered by the constant drag of debt service. That's not a "crisis" yet, but it's a problem that needs to be addressed before it becomes one. 

Continue reading "Is There a Student Loan Debt Crisis?" »

Lessons For Consumer Protection From The World Of Inclusive Capitalism

posted by David Lander

Lately I have been teaching courses with names such as "Global and Economic Justice" and "History, Impacts and Regulation of Consumer Credit" instead of "Bankruptcy," "Secured Transactions" and "Chapter 11 Reorganizations." So I have been reading different books and listening to different speakers. A lecture I attended recently by Xav Briggs  here brought to my mind a couple of books that I use in one of my courses, “Borrow” and “Debtor Nation” both written by Louis Hyman. In many ways Hyman's books remind me of "Credit Card Nation" the outstanding and "ahead of its time" book by Robert Manning which I used extensively when I created my consumer credit course in 2002. 

Part of the wisdom I find in each of these books is the caveat that you cannot understand consumer protection without understanding the nature of American capitalism or the drive for an above-market return. This was never clearer or more of a "blow to the side of the head" than during the frenzy in the early 2000's, and perhaps nothing demonstrates it more crassly than the rating agencies covering their eyes as they rated subprime securitizations allegedly in order to "keep the business." 

Continue reading "Lessons For Consumer Protection From The World Of Inclusive Capitalism " »

Can We Count on Macro-Economists to Analyze the Impacts of Inequality?

posted by David Lander

Prior to the crash, only a very few macro-economists were studying consumer borrowing and fewer still were investigating inequality of income or of wealth as an important macro-economic factor. Work in macro-economics is done at academic institutions, the Fed, think tanks and government and private enterprises. Historically, very few PhD dissertations in macro-economics dealt with consumer finance or consumer spending or inequality issues. Prior to the crash there was a divide between the small minority (which included some high prestige folks such as Joseph Stiglitz) and the dominate majority. Both sides make extensive use of mathematical formulae but the majority looks more like physics and the minority may include a dose of sociology.  This is important stuff because government fiscal policy and even monetary policy and private business decisions are often based on the work of these folks. The majority tended to believe that humans act rationally while the minority helped develop the field of behavioral economics. 

Continue reading "Can We Count on Macro-Economists to Analyze the Impacts of Inequality?" »

Quantifying the Benefits of the Fresh Start

posted by Jason Kilborn

I recently discovered a not-so-new paper that provides a useful answer to a question I've asked before:  Who benefits from consumer bankruptcy, and to what degree? This is a real challenge for policy-making, and well-supported answers are essential to greasing the wheels of reform.

In this paper, Will Dobbie (Princeton) and Jae Song (SSA) use a creative technique, comparing the financial outcomes of Chapter 13 debtors whose plans were--and were not--confirmed to probe the positive effects of access to such relief (apparently whether or not the payment plan is successfully completed). Successful access to Chapter 13 protection led to over $5000 in increased annual earnings in the first ten post-filing years and a 3.5 percentage-point increase in employment over the first five post-filing years, including a nearly 3 percentage-point increase in self employment. Access to relief also reduced the receipt of "welfare" benefits and increased retirement savings contributions.  Most striking, access to debt relief reduced mortality (presumably by decreasing stress) during this period by almost 2 percentage points--which is a 47.5% decrease from the mean for filers whose cases were dismissed, largely attributable to a large, positive effect on filers over 60. The authors attribute these gains to an increased incentive to work and produce earnings and  reduction in economic instability and stress.

The results of this study are among the many individual and societal benefits of consumer bankruptcy commonly identified in legal literature. Indeed, the authors conclude that "individual debt relief is much more likely to be welfare-improving than previously realized"--and these instances of individual welfare redound in direct ways to the state and society as a whole. While I can see a variety of quibbles that empirical scholars might have with this study, the results provide fairly solid support for the most common working theories of relief, and they offer even greater comfort for policymakers searching for reasons to introduce or expand individual debt relief.

How the Disappearance of Locally-Owned Banks Hurts Rural Economic Development

posted by Nathalie Martin

In preparation for some upcoming projects with sociologists, including my new collaborator Rob Mayer (Utah) and on another project, Alan Burton (UNM Sociology professors and UNM law student), I am beefing up on my sociology research. Alan directed me to a recent article, Restructuring the Financial Industry: The Disappearance of Locally-Owned Traditional Financial Services in Rural America. This article explains how the loss of small banks in rural America has negatively affected economic development, which has in turn reduced opportunities for rural communities to increase income, reduce poverty, decrease out-immigration, and reduce crime rates.

Continue reading "How the Disappearance of Locally-Owned Banks Hurts Rural Economic Development" »

Local and State Treasurers Can Build Wealth in Struggling Communities

posted by Nathalie Martin

Sometimes you can beat the door down with efforts to get Federal and State officials to tackle problems, but at the end of the day, locals can best get the job done, quietly and quickly. A story in Monday’s New York Times bears this out.  For example, San Francisco City Treasure Jose Cisneros noticed that families who finally took advantage the of the earned income credit, the country’s largest public benefit program, often had no bank accounts in which to deposit their refunds. This meant losing a portion of this important public benefit to check cashers and others.

Because of this problem, Treasurer Cisneros started a program called Bank On, that helps people on the financial fringes open bank accounts and develop credit histories. This model has spread across the country, leading the Treasury Department to conclude that Bank On has “great potential” to “create a nationwide initiative that attends to the needs of underserved families and works to eradicate financial instability throughout the country.” In 2010, Mr. Cisneros also started Kindergarten to College, a program that automatically opened a bank account with $50 ($100 for low-income families) for every kindergartner in public schools. The city pays for the administration and initial deposits, while corporate, foundation and private donations provide matching money to encourage families to save more. His office even figured out how to open bank accounts for thousands of children without social security numbers.

These and similar effort have now been replicated in more than 100 cities, showing that even mundane public races might make a big difference in the health and well-being of citizens, if not the entire U.S. economy.

Would it Surprise You to Know

posted by Stephen Lubben

That I still think the "safe harbors" as currenlty drafted are a bad thing?

Econometric Optimization of Fresh Start Policy

posted by Jason Kilborn

"What is the optimal consumer bankruptcy law?" Now that's an abstract first line that grabs my attention! I've thought about this question for most of my academic career, and I've struggled to find solid bases for an answer. Now, Indiana Univeristy economist Gray Gordon offers an intriguing if difficult to understand possibility. In his paper, Optimal Bankruptcy Code: A Fresh Start for Some, Gordon actually quantifies the sweet spot: (1) an optimal system offers a discharge of debt (a constant refrain in policy papers, e.g., here and here), (2) it does so for households whose debt is 2.6 times their endowment, and (3) this optimal system results in a welfare gain of 12.2%. The conclusion is nowhere near as confusing for a non-economist (like me) as the proof, expressed in inscrutable Greek-symbol-filled equations which occupy the bulk of the paper. But this paper offers a rock solid answer to a question that has plagued Europe, in particular, for many years--how does one define "overindebtedness" and therefore the proper entry criterion for personal debt relief. Gordon's answer is very powerful, though I wonder how compelling the econometrics are behind these hard numbers. I'm not at all qualified to critique Gordon's proofs, but I'm a bit skeptical in light of Gordon's observation that "[r]elative to the U.S., the optimal policy results in a four-fold increase in the bankruptcy filing rate and a thirty-fold increase in debt." Whoah! Anyone care to comment on what could be a really groundbreaking new approach?

Markets?

posted by Stephen Lubben

Some thoughts on how much faith we should have in the debt markets, and whether they are actually markets at all, over at Dealb%k.

Working and Living in the Shadow of Economic Fragility

posted by Melissa Jacoby

OupbookCredit Slips readers, please note the publication of a new book edited by Marion Crain and Michael Sherraden. The New America Foundation is hosting an event on the book tomorrow, Wednesday, May 28, 2014 at 12:15 EST. Not in Washington, D.C.? The event will be webcast live

The book project developed out of a stimulating multi-disciplinary conference at Washington University in St. Louis. Participants had great interest in considering how bankruptcy scholarship fits within the larger universe of research on financial insecurity and inequality. My chapter with Mirya Holman synthesizes the literature on medical problems among bankruptcy filers and presents new results from the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy Project on coping mechanisms for medical bills, looking more closely at the one in four respondents who reported accepting a payment plan from a medical provider. Not surprisingly, these filers are far more likely than most others to bring identifiable medical debt, and therefore their medical providers, into their bankruptcy cases. We examine how payment plan users employ strategies - including but not limited to fringe and informal borrowing - to manage financial distress before resorting to bankruptcy, and (quite briefly) speculate on the future of medical-related financial distress in an Affordable Care Act world.

The Behavioral Economics of Bitcoin

posted by Adam Levitin

I'm going to wade into unchartered Slips waters today and head into Bitcoinland. I've been trying to understand Bitcoin from a payment systems perspective, where it has an interesting problem and solution:  double spending.  The lesson in all of this is how Bitcoin has a sort of built in seniorage--payments are never free. Currently Bitcoin builds in its costs through inflation, which is not particularly transparent, but that will ultimately change to being more transparent--and salient-- transaction fees. By disguising its costs through inflation, rather than through direct fees, Bitcoin effectively incentivizes greater consumer use of the system, much as credit card usage is incentivized through no-surcharge rules preventing merchants from passing on the cost of credit card usage to consumers. 

Continue reading "The Behavioral Economics of Bitcoin" »

Most Politically Tone-Deaf Statement of the Year?

posted by Stephen Lubben
I'm quite sure China's plea to “ensure the safety of the Chinese investments” will bring certain members of of the House to their senses. 

Why Is the Fed Chairman a Bank Regulator (or an Economist)?

posted by Adam Levitin

The NY Times has a pretty significant error in its reporting on the Summers vs. Yellen Fed Chair race. It says that Yellen was the head of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, which was Countrywide's regulator. That's wrong. FRBSF was never Countrywide's primary regulator. That was the OCC and then OTS. The regional Feds are not anyone's primary regulator, not least as they are private entities, not government agencies. They arguably have a secondary quasi-regulatory role, but that's it. They are not the same as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, which is a federal regulator. Yellen really can't be tagged with any of the blame for Countrywide, at least based on what's reported. The NYT should correct this point, which comes off as a bit of a smear on Yellen.

Continue reading "Why Is the Fed Chairman a Bank Regulator (or an Economist)?" »

Legal Solutions to Non-Legal Problems

posted by Bob Lawless

Again, this is me posting on Adam Levitin's behalf because he is away from Internet access as he owns an Apple computer (often a redundant statement). Adam writes:

Continue reading "Legal Solutions to Non-Legal Problems" »

Another Myth of Consumer Law?

posted by Lauren Willis

As the CFPB gears up to regulate arbitration clauses, a timely article by Omri Ben-Shahar has been posted on ssrn. Part of Ben-Shahar’s “Myths of Consumer Law” project (see here, here, and here ), The Myth of Access-to-Justice in Consumer Law  contains some provocative insights, but key blind spots lead the piece to unwarranted conclusions.

The conclusions are that pre-dispute arbitration and class action waiver clauses in consumer contracts benefit weak consumers. To get there, Ben-Shahar first notes that consumers are not a homogeneous group and access to justice in the courts is far from evenly distributed. Because elites are more likely to sue and are likely to collect higher damages (one of the many reasons they are more likely to sue), giving all consumers the right to sue is, in effect, a regressive cross-subsidy from poorer consumers to those elites.

Continue reading "Another Myth of Consumer Law?" »

Vermont Employer uses Behavioral Economics to Turn Debt into Wealth

posted by Nathalie Martin

Some readers might enjoy this PBS video about a Northern Vermont company that helps people weather financial storms with small loans. Rhino Foods in Burlington found that employees in financial strain were not as good at their jobs and that the small loans improved the company’s bottom line.  Rhino brought in a combination social worker/financial advisor, who helped arrange 17% income advance loans paid back through wage deductions. Once a loan is paid off, the default rule is that the employee continues to pay into a savings account in the same amount as the prior loan repayment deduction. People who had never saved a dime are now building wealth.

 

 

Minimum Wage & Consumer Borrowing

posted by Bob Lawless

Over at VoxEU, economists Daniel Aronson and Eric French have a discussion about the their research of the effects of a minimum wage hike. I found my way to this post through Yves Smith's discussion of the topic at Naked Capitalism, which also includes some informative tables showing that the proposed hike to $9/hour is still below a living wage in many areas of the country.

Continue reading "Minimum Wage & Consumer Borrowing" »

The Behavioral Economics of Title Lending

posted by Paige Marta Skiba

Shutterstock_52608853 copyThis week we have discussed some of the interesting facts our recent research has uncovered about the title lending industry and its borrowers. One of the goals of our research is to use economics tools, from both neo-classical and behavioral economics, to develop a broader understanding of how borrowers are making choices in this market.

Continue reading "The Behavioral Economics of Title Lending" »

CoTA and the Fiscal Deal

posted by Bob Lawless

US Grand PrixOver the holiday break, Credit Slips went on an unplanned hiatus. "Unplanned" could just be implied because most everything that happens here is unplanned. Between everyone's travels, nothing got posted in between Christmas and New Year's. I hope the new year is starting off well for all of our our readers. Although off topic, I thought I would start off 2013 by achieving an important goal of my own, which is to finally work Formula 1 into one of my posts.

Last night's fiscal deal predictably included a number of special-interest tax breaks. The one that caught my attention has been dubbed the "Nascar tax break" by the media. Instead of a long depreciation period of 15 to 39 years, a "motorsports entertainment complex" has been eligible for accelerated depreciation over seven years (26 U.S.C. 168(k)(1)). By accelerating depreciation, the owners of a race track getting bigger tax deductions more quickly instead of smaller deductions spread out over a longer period of time. This particular tax break had been available for any race track placed into service before December 31, 2011, but the fiscal cliff deal extended that date through December 31, 2013.

Continue reading "CoTA and the Fiscal Deal" »

EU Update (And FI Reality)

posted by Stephen Lubben

If you've been tuning out the Euro situation, despite Gelpern's periodic updates, today's Times magazine has a since summary of where things stand.

I also think the end of this bit nicely captures the extant cynicism regarding financial institutions.

4. Is Europe a Lehman in waiting? About 20 percent of U.S. foreign trade is with the E.U. That’s significant, but if the European economy collapses, it’s quite likely that China, India, Brazil and several gulf states will pick up much of the slack. And a truly collapsed euro would mean discounts on everything from French wine to Italian shoes to Greek yogurt. More worrying is if a) the euro zone faces an abrupt financial panic, and b) it turns out that many American banks are overly invested in those suddenly defunct European banks. There is a general assumption that U.S. banks are prepared for the worst. But many in the financial world thought they were prepared for the collapse of Lehman Brothers too.

Importantly, my sense from talking with people who work at FIs is that they don't understand this is how they are perceived by the vast bulk of people.

Why Don't Economists Read the Legal Literature?

posted by Adam Levitin

When I read economics articles, I'm often struck by the absence of citations to the legal literature. Citations to legal works, even when very much on point, are frequently missing from literature reviews and citation lists. I don't think this is just a matter of citation; economists don't seem to generally be reading the legal literature. And this can result in embarassing mistakes in the economics scholarship, as the legal regimes affecting the subject of study are often misunderstood. (In fairness, I've seen similar problems in the legal literature...)

There are exceptions to be sure.  Some notable articles and scholars are cited routinely, and I've also noticed that economists will cite articles in some of the law & economics journals (like JLE and JLEO), but then economists also publish in those journals. This contrasts with the legal literature, which frequently cites to the economics literature. I'm curious what might explain this phenomenon.  

Here are some non-exclusive possible explanations (in no particular order); I'm interested in hearing readers thoughts:

Continue reading "Why Don't Economists Read the Legal Literature?" »

Reputational Sanctions in an Age of Internet Manipulation?

posted by Adam Levitin

A major argument against substantive regulation of industries (including consumer finance) is that the market self-regulates. Bad actors get bad reputations and lose business.  Therefore, there's no need for government to intervene.  

This type of argument involves a significant set of assumptions about how reputational sanctions work for any particular product and about the inability of bad actors to simply rename themselves. Often, these assumptions are unexamined or unwarranted--ideology trumps all--but the development of the Internet as a reputational reference complicates things. 

The Internet provides a tremendous aggregation of reputational feedback, with everything from formal reviews to "XYZsucks.com" sites, etc. But the typical Internet reputational search involves a google search or the like, and the search results are manipulable. Not only can they be manipulated, but there are whole businesses set up to do just that.

Continue reading "Reputational Sanctions in an Age of Internet Manipulation?" »

The Permanent Foreclosure Crisis and Obama's Refinancing Obsession

posted by Alan White

For the umpteenth time, President Obama has announced that his solution to the foreclosure crisis is to encourage "responsible" homeowners to refinance at lower interest rates.  Adopting the Tea Party rhetoric and blaming home buyers who got houses in 2006 for their inability to foresee what few economists foresaw, Obama has steadfastly refused to push for principal reductions and payment suspensions for homeowners behind in payments, lest their luckier neighbors who bought at lower prices become resentful.  As a result, he continues to offer help to homeowners who need it least.

Behind the rhetoric is an important policy choice: who will bear the billions of mortgage losses that have yet to be flushed out of the system.  Principal reduction modifications for defaulted borrowers would distribute the losses among taxpayers (via Fannie and Freddie), private investors and banks (who hold non-GSE loans), and give underwater homeowners some relief.  More importantly, principal modifications mitigate the aggregate losses to the system while accelerating the necessary deleveraging. Refinancing current borrowers does nothing to prevent the huge deadweight losses from continuing foreclosures, at 50% loss severities, on homes whose owners are delinquent.  Choosing to do no more for the 7 million or so delinquent mortgage debtors means maximizing losses to those homeowners, but also to taxpayers and investors.  It would certainly help to continue driving down home prices, which does benefit new first-time buyers, but at a huge aggregate cost. 

In fact, as conservator of the nationalized Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the federal government could make the needed modifications of delinquent mortgages happen with a stroke of the pen, more or less. Instead, the Administration proposes the dubious strategy of loading up the FHA portfolio with 4% mortgages at 125% loan-to-value ratios, thus continuing the process of transferring future mortgage losses from banks to taxpayers, and amplifying those losses, while letting the foreclosure crisis continue, just as Mitt Romney proposes.  Nothing about the refinancing strategy moves forward the process of realigning mortgage debt to home values.  Instead, the strategy relies on the doubtful proposition that home values will soon return to rising at their pre-2007 clip.

Pacta sunt servanda and the housing market and broader economy be damned. 

The Value(s) of Foreclosure Law Reform?

posted by Melissa Jacoby

As Alan White reported recently, the Uniform Law Commission in the U.S. has named a committee to consider the need for and feasibility of proposing a uniform foreclosure act and to report back to the ULC by early 2012. A letter from the ULC president includes a list of questions that the committee is charged to consider. But what principles will guide their analysis of these questions?

Continue reading "The Value(s) of Foreclosure Law Reform?" »

Robbing Peter to Pay Paul: US Economy Edition

posted by Adam Levitin

The Administration seems to have cut a deal to extend the payroll tax cut, which is a smart economic move in terms of trying to support demand. But it's being paid for by an increase in the "G-fee" (guarantee fee) charged by FHA and Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac on the loans they purchase. In other words, anyone refinancing or taking out a mortgage now will be subsidizing reduced payroll taxes.  The result is robbing Peter to pay Paul, which means the economic benefits from extending the payroll tax cut are going to be muted by the chill this puts on the struggling housing market.  

The argument that it will encourage homeowners to look for non-GSE/FHA loans is pretty silly and hides the foolishness of using housing to pay for payroll tax cuts. Homeowners don't choose whether they have a GSE loan or not. They choose whether to do FHA or not, but if it's not an FHA loan, the homeowner doesn't know if the loan is going to stay in the lender's portfolio, be sold to another lender, be sold to a GSE (and maybe securitized by the GSE) or be privately securitized. Raising the costs of the GSE execution might encourage more portfolio lending, but it's hard to believe that a few basis point change in GSE execution costs is going to suddenly make the private-label securitization market revive.  The problems in that market aren't just the economics--particularly of servicing--but the utter lack of trust investors have in the underwriting, documentation, and servicing. For the private-label market to revive, there will need to be a much more significant difference in execution costs between private-label and the GSEs. The increased G-fee doesn't do it. 

It's painfully apparent that this Administration doesn't have a housing policy, and that's a serious problem when housing is the anchor weighing down the economy.  Consider, on the one hand, the Administration tries to make refinancing easier via the expansion of HARP.  Then it raises the "G-fee" that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac charge on every loan they purchase, which gets passed on the homeowner in the form of a higher mortgage rate.  (I'm not sure of the pass-through rate, but I'd guess it's pretty high.)  If the Administration is trying to fix the housing market, this sure isn't the way to do it.

Oh, Just Stop!

posted by Stephen Lubben

Many have chided the financial press for the need to write entirely speculative articles about the prior day's market movements. But at least the financial press can be (somewhat) forgiven for their sins on the basis of tradition. What would the FT do with that big space on the back of the first section if it were otherwise?

But now the Washington crowd is getting in on the act and it must be stopped. The Hill's On the Money blog manages to commit two sins of casual empiricism within the first three paragraphs of their piece on the market's reaction to the President's jobs speech. First they say the markets "plummeted" in reaction to the speech, and then, conceding that there might have been other factors at work (say, maybe this), they conclude that "Obama’s speech had little countervailing effect."

So either they are doing a very sophisticated event study here, or they are just making stuff up. How precisely, do we know that the markets did not go down less than they would have without the speech?

Grrr.

Debating Madoff

posted by Stephen Lubben

Andrew Ross Sorkin and I debate the Madoff/Divorce/Paul Weiss thing in the comments to this post over at Dealbook.

BTW, I do agree with Andrew about the pro bono point that Felix Salmon brought up -- this is not really pro bono work, rather a benefit that all employees of big firms get (even the associates, to some degree:  for example, coop closing are done by "in house" people.). Of course, one might wonder how much family law experience the folks at Paul Weiss actually have . . . 

Understanding the Dollar

posted by Stephen Lubben

A very good discussion over at the Economist about why political (and water cooler) discussions of the USD are so often just wrong.

Perceptions of Income Inequality

posted by Bob Lawless

A friend alerted me to "Building a Better America -- One Wealth Quintile at a Time," an article by Michael Norton of the Harvard Business School and Dan Ariely of Duke University and that appears in the current issue of Perspectives on Psychological Science. Although a discussion of the paper kicked around in the blogosphere last fall, I missed it. Credit Slips readers might find the paper interesting but, if you're like me, might not otherwise see it. Here is the abstract:

Disagreements about the optimal level of wealth inequality underlie policy debates ranging from taxation to welfare. We attempt to insert the desires of “regular” Americans into these debates, by asking a nationally representative online panel to estimate the current distribution of wealth in the United States and to “build a better America” by constructing distributions with their ideal level of inequality. First, respondents dramatically underestimated the current level of wealth inequality. Second, respondents constructed ideal wealth distributions that were far more equitable than even their erroneously low estimates of the actual distribution. Most important from a policy perspective, we observed a surprising level of consensus: All demographic groups – even those not usually associated with wealth redistribution such as Republicans and the wealthy – desired a more equal distribution of wealth than the status quo.

A full version of the paper can be found on Professor Norton's web site.

Expanding Chapter 9

posted by Stephen Lubben

I wade into the "states in bankruptcy" debate over at Dealbook.

Modern Redlining in Historical Context

posted by Ethan Cohen-Cole

A paper that I wrote while an employee of the Federal Reserve System a couple years back documents the presence of ‘redlining’ in the issue of credit cards. Credit Slips picked it up here (link).

(To ensure there are no misunderstandings, this paper did not and does not represent the views of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston or the Federal Reserve System; in fact, both entities did their utmost to prevent its release) ... continue…

To be more specific: I find that credit issuers use the racial composition of a neighborhood in determining how much credit to give to individuals that live in it. I use the term ‘redlining’ with historical reference: this idea is that particular areas have been identified as high risk. What I find is that the ‘high risk’ areas are highly correlated with the presence of minorities.

I’ll be clear, I cannot definitely prove that lenders use race—I’m an economist, not a lawyer! Regardless, I’ll present the point that the practice is still redlining even if lenders never use race, but use location-based information that is correlated with race.

Continue reading "Modern Redlining in Historical Context" »

Mad About Debt

posted by Alan White

Exit polls tell us that the economy was forefront in the minds of yesterday's voters, but also that the national debt was high on the list of concerns.  The deep personal anxiety about the national debt surely is not just civic worry about Uncle Sam's credit rating.  Americans are in some measure projecting their own debt anxieties onto the government.  While one in three voter's family has experienced a job loss, household debt is affecting nearly everyone.

Nearly four years into the crisis (formerly called the subprime mortgage crisis) we are still suffering a massive hangover from the debt binge of the last decade.  In ten years household debt exploded from five and a half trillion to nearly fourteen trillion dollars.  From the onset of the crisis in 2007 through June 2010 mortgage debt and all the rest (credit cards, student loans) has inched down painfully slowly.  It would take thirty years at the present rate to bring household debt back to something like its 2000 levels.  Folks seeking mortgage workouts, over a million of them, are paying an average of 80% of gross income for debt service.  Students are graduating college with six-figure debt.

Continue reading "Mad About Debt" »

Foreclosure Crisis Update

posted by Alan White

Screen shot 2010-09-03 at 4.03.35 PM New numbers are out for the second quarter from the Mortgage Bankers Association’s National Delinquency Survey and HOPE NOW.  After three years, the ramp-up phase of the foreclosure crisis seems to be ending, as the rate of mortgages in default or foreclosure has leveled off, albeit at historically unprecedented and appalling levels.  The bad news is that new (30- and 60-day) delinquencies are still high, although down just a bit from their early 2009 peak, so that the foreclosure pipeline will remain primed for many months to come.   Equally problematic are the huge numbers of very-overdue loans not yet in foreclosure, still at five times their normal level, and portending continued high foreclosure inventory and sale rates for the foreseeable future.

Continue reading "Foreclosure Crisis Update" »

End User Exemptions

posted by Stephen Lubben

I've been talking with Mike at Rortybomb about derivatives and bankruptcy, and the pending financial reform legislation. But being a professor, I of course have more to say about the ongoing debate about exempting certain "end users" of derivatives from the proposed rule that all derivative trades go through a central clearing process and trade on an exchange.

The key complaint that "end users" have is this new trading and clearing structure will require collateral to be posted to ensure the "out of the money" party's ability to perform on the deal.  For railroads, manufacturers, and others who use derivatives as hedges, this means that cash or other cash-like stuff will be parked somewhere, unavailable for use. And their ability to use derivatives will be limited by their ability to post collateral.

First, I'm beginning to wonder about how you define "end user," which is why I've been using the obnoxious quotes up to this point. A hedge fund is an end user of derivatives. Really anyone who has an unbalanced position in derivatives could be considered an end user. Congress has to be really careful on this slippery slope.

Second, if the "end users" of the world think that getting out of clearing and exchange trading gets them out of posting collateral, they might want to think about that some more. There is nothing in the new law that would prevent a big bank from demanding both mark to market and "additional" collateral in connection with an OTC trade. Indeed, since these banks are going to be under increased regulation, they may be required to get collateral from big customers. So if the end users get their exemption, what have they achieved? Exposure to the risk that the big bank will fail, taking their collateral with it.

The Financial Reform Legislation

posted by Stephen Lubben

Having been involved at the edges of the financial reform legislation for the past few weeks, a few observations to date:

  • Warren Buffett apparently supports derivative regulation, so long as it does not apply to him. "Me too" say Goldman, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, several dozen hedge funds, GM, Union Pacific, . . .:
  • ISDA and friends have a new argument for why derivatives should get special treatment under the Bankruptcy Code:  collateral.  "If regulators want everyone to use collateral to back up derivative trades, we need special treatment."  Why they can't be treated like every other secured creditor under the Code remains unexplained.
  • Another argument in favor of retaining special treatment, even made by those who work for the financial regulators, is that the move to central clearing requires special treatment. Unaddressed is the problem that many derivatives are still not centrally cleared, and won't be for a long time. And I worry that without the incentives that come from facing real bankruptcy risk, central clearing authorities will become little more than a kind of Central Services, routing paper (or electrons) between the relevant parties, and not performing the kind of counterparty risk assessment that clearing is supposed to bring.

Resolution Authority: Voting Rules

posted by Stephen Lubben

Presently both the new Financial Stability Oversight Counsel and the Federal Reserve Board must each vote to recommend action under the resolution authority, and each must do so by a 2/3 vote. More over, the Secretary then must decide if a petition actually will be filed.

This structure seems overly cumbersome, and essentially means that all three actors must agree before the resolution authority can be invoked. This might create problems in the future – for example, imagine a Secretary that objected to ever invoking the resolution authority.

Solution: Make the “and” into an “or” with regard to recommending action:  either the Counsel or the Board can recommend action by a 2/3 vote. And allow the two acting in unison to override the Secretary and file a petition with the Panel. The Secretary can have standing to object in front of the Panel.

Resolution Authority: Missing an Umpire

posted by Stephen Lubben

The current draft of the Dodd bill does not provide for a anyone comparable to the bankruptcy judge in a chapter 11 case. Instead, the proposed legislation allows parties to seek review of the receiver’s decision to allow or disallow a claim in the district court “for the district within which the principal place of business of the covered financial company is located (and such court shall have jurisdiction to hear such claim).”

First note that this means that case will start in Delaware with the Panel, but will likely end up in the Southern District of New York for claims resolution. Moreover, the court seems to be limited to hearing claims disputes – whereas it arguably might be better to have a general “referee” for all disputes. But most importantly, I doubt that the district court in the SDNY is the right place to resolve these matters. The SDNY district court is widely perceived to be slow in acting on bankruptcy appeals, and is often weighed down with a lengthy docket of criminal cases that understandably has priority on the judges’ time. Bankruptcy judges – particularly those that routinely handle large chapter 11 cases – are more accustomed to acting with the kind of speed that is required for these matters. Otherwise the FDIC will face the prospect of some district judge ruling against its treatment of a claim years after everyone thought the case was fully administered.

Solution: When picking the members of the Panel (see my last post), pick a fourth judge who will act as trial judge to resolve these issues.

Resolution Authority: The New Court

posted by Stephen Lubben

Under the Dodd bill, petitions to invoke the resolution authority are to be presented to a new Liquidation Authority Panel. Under section 202 of the bill, the Panel is to be comprised of three Delaware bankruptcy judges, selected by the Chief Judge. Presently there are seven bankruptcy judges in Delaware, including the Chief.

This seems like too small of a pool to select the judges from, and Wilmington seems like an unlikely place to hold the kind of secret hearings contemplated in this legislation. Moreover, most of the key governmental, legal, and financial actors in these matters are based in New York.

Solution:  Create a nationwide court, based in New York, utilizing the best bankruptcy judges from around the country. Having a bigger pool also provides a source for alternate members if a particular member is unavailable when the Panel is called. The Panel can share infrastructure with the SDNY bankruptcy court. Since the Panel’s role is essentially administrative, you might even consider having a non-judge on the Panel (e.g., a legal or finance academic). Finally, perhaps there should be annual education requirements for panel members so they stay up to date with the latest developments.

Resolution Authority: Safe Harbors

posted by Stephen Lubben

This is the first of a series of posts commenting on the resolution authority as it currently appears in the Dodd bill.

The present draft of the bill includes “safe harbors” that excuse derivatives from the normal operation of the resolution authority – with a vague suggestion that the safe harbors might be suspended for five days while the receiver tries to transfer assets to a buyer, although no indication if termination provisions can be enforced once the derivatives are in the hands of the buyer. And the draft does not address the safe harbors already in the Bankruptcy Code, even though the resolution authority contemplates that all but the largest institutions will proceed under the Code.

Every legal academic that has considered the “safe harbors” that excuse derivatives from the normal operation of the Bankruptcy Code has determined that these provisions increase systemic risk. In a recent paper I show how the intersection of derivatives and insolvency could be better addressed with narrowly targeted amendments to the Code, rather than safe harbors.

Safe harbors are typically justified in terms of systemic risk. The systemic risk argument for the safe harbors is based on the belief that the inability to close out a derivative position because of the automatic stay would cause a daisy chain of failure amongst financial institutions. The problem with this argument is that it fails to consider the risks created by the rush to close out positions and demand collateral from distressed firms. Not only does this contribute to the failure of an already weakened financial firm, by fostering a run on the firm, but it also has consequent effects on the markets generally, as parties rush to sell trades with the debtor and buy corresponding positions with new counterparties.

Solution:  Safe harbor provisions should be removed from the bill and from the Bankruptcy Code. These statutes can be slightly modified to account for the reality of derivatives in modern finance (e.g., allow “mark to market” collateral adjustments to continue until the derivative is assumed or rejected).

The President on Financial Reform

posted by Stephen Lubben

I had the honor of being invited to the President's speech on financial reform this morning at Cooper IMG_0717 Union. The speech was somewhat general, but that is probably to be expected when talking for a short time about a complex issue and a massive chunk of legislation.

(N.B.  I'm writing this up before looking at any of the press coverage so I can present my impressions "untainted" by the conventional wisdom.)

Two important points that I was glad to hear. First, he noted that resolution authority could be paid for ex ante or ex post, and people could legitimately disagree over which was better, but you needed to find a way to make sure the financial industry paid for its own resolution. I think this is right, and reflects the realistic options. I know some suggest we can simply put the big financial firms into bankruptcy without doing anything more, but if Paulson and Bush couldn't stomach that (after one attempt), I don't know who could. The broader consequences of that intellectually pure approach will never be politically palatable.

Second, he refused to demonize derivatives, which would have been the easy political move. He explained that there are legitimate uses for derivatives, but the real issue was bringing transparency to the market, so it would be clear to all if somebody like AIG went off the deep end in terms of counterparty risk and exposure.

The one thing I would have liked to have seen was some support for the safe harbor reforms now percolating through Congress, such as Senator Bill Nelson's proposal. This amendment is not perfect, and I've explained what I think works as a compromise position, but amendments of this sort are a big step in the right direction, and get the issue on the table.

Some Thoughts on Central Clearing

posted by Stephen Lubben

As the financial reform legislation moves forward, central clearing of derivatives has become a key topic of interest, along with the related, but distinct issue of exchange trading of derivatives. Central clearing refers to having a party that acts as the "hub" in derivatives transactions, so that a bilateral contract actually becomes two bilateral contracts, with the clearing agency in the center. This should generally increase transparency, including with regard to conterparty risk.

Most of the focus has been on the counterparties, and which sorts of counterparties should be required to transaction through a central clearing house. But I do worry that not enough focus is being placed on rules to govern the central clearing agency. As I have argued in some recent papers, the central clearing agency must have robust margin requirements for its members, as well as an ability to draw liquidity from at least the larger members in times of crisis. Otherwise the central clearing agency itself will become a "too big to fail" entity in need of a bailout.

I also continue to believe that repeal of the special treatment of derivatives in bankruptcy (and in the resolution authority, as proposed in the Dodd bill) is needed to give the central clearing party the appropriate incentives to monitor its exposure to counterparties.

On the issue of clearing itself, I think we need to take some of the uproar with a grain of salt. The big players -- banks, large hedge funds and the like -- are already moving toward clearing and posting collateral with third-parties. I suspect that sooner or later they are also going to figure out that they are much better off dealing with a single entity in the corporate chain, or at least entities that are all in a single jurisdiction, to avoid the problems seen in Lehman. Thus, putting all derivative trading into a single sub will make sense anyway.

Why then are some of these same parties so vocal in their opposition? Well, some of it surely has to do with the sale of derivatives to parties who might not be ready to take these steps, and a fear that these parties will simply reduce their derivatives purchases rather than take the steps to comply with the new rules. They might also replace more complex swaps with simpler contracts like futures. Neither is clearly bad or inefficient from a societal perspective, but you can understand why the banks might not like it.

That said, I'm going to challenge the conventional reformist wisdom by wondering aloud if its really necessary to centrally clear everything. Some flexibility might be good. Of course, there needs to be a cost to taking that option, since it could impose a cost on the rest of us -- most obviously, the collateral posting requirements could be substantially higher for trades that are not cleared. Perhaps a multiple of margin required for a cleared trade?

UPDATE:  Risk magazine has more.

Contributors

Current Guests

Follow Us On Twitter

Like Us on Facebook

  • Like Us on Facebook

    By "Liking" us on Facebook, you will receive excerpts of our posts in your Facebook news feed. (If you change your mind, you can undo it later.) Note that this is different than "Liking" our Facebook page, although a "Like" in either place will get you Credit Slips post on your Facebook news feed.

News Feed

Categories

Bankr-L

  • As a public service, the University of Illinois College of Law operates Bankr-L, an e-mail list on which bankruptcy professionals can exchange information. Bankr-L is administered by one of the Credit Slips bloggers, Professor Robert M. Lawless of the University of Illinois. Although Bankr-L is a free service, membership is limited only to persons with a professional connection to the bankruptcy field (e.g., lawyer, accountant, academic, judge). To request a subscription on Bankr-L, click here to visit the page for the list and then click on the link for "Subscribe." After completing the information there, please also send an e-mail to Professor Lawless (rlawless@illinois.edu) with a short description of your professional connection to bankruptcy. A link to a URL with a professional bio or other identifying information would be great.

OTHER STUFF

Powered by TypePad