Over at Dealb%k. (BTW, I don't pick the pictures).
There's a great new paper available on out-of-court restructuring and the Trust Indenture Act. The New Bond Workouts is up on SSRN. From the abstract it sounds pretty darn amazing—a new, empirically based analysis of bond restructurings that rediscovers a long-forgotten intercreditor duty of good faith:
The Second Circuit on Tuesday released its long-awaited opinion on the Trust Indenture Act, Marblegate v. EDMC. Several of us Slipsters have been discussing the case behind the scenes, and others will have (more intelligent) things to say about the opinion than I, but I thought I'd introduce the blockbuster case to get us rolling.
Long story short, the TIA essentially prohibits out-of-court workouts over the objection of any noteholder whose notes (debt securities) are part of the issuance qualified under the TIA. Section 316(b) says "the right of any holder of an indenture security to receive payment ... or to institute suit for the enforcement of any such payment ... shall not be impaired or affected without the consent of such holder." (emphasis added). The case was about what it means to "impair or affect" the "right" to get paid under indentured notes. The creative argument advanced by Marblegate was that lots of activities having nothing to do with changing the notes or their terms can "impair or affect" its right to get paid, and EDMC crossed the line. EDMC had done a creative end-run around the TIA by suffering its secured creditors to foreclose their (undisputed) security interests in all of its assets and then resell those assets to a newly created subsidiary of EDMC, scrubbing the former unsecured claims from those assets and leaving Marblegate and other noteholders with a claim against an empty shell. This was the second option in a Hobson's choice presented to noteholders; the first was to accept a 67% haircut and participate in a global workout with the secured creditors. Nearly 100% of the noteholders chose this option; Marblegate chose to play chicken and see if the courts would allow EDMC and its secured creditors to wipe out Marblegate's practical ability to enforce its claim by leaving an empty shell as the only obligor on Marblegate's unsecured debt after senior secured claimants exercised their superior rights in every scrap of available value. The contractual terms of Marblegate's right to collect were unchanged, but the practical ability of Marblegate to make anything of this right was clearly "impaired and affected," Marblegate argued.
For Slips readers that might not otherwise see it, I wanted to highlight this post on the Delaware Corporate & Commercial Litigation Blog, about a recent state supreme court decision on the distinction between setoff and recoupment, and the applicability of the statute of limitations to the former.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 23-46:
It shall be unlawful for any individual, corporation, or firm or other association of persons, to solicit of any creditor any claim of such creditor in order that such individual, corporation, firm or association may represent such creditor or present or vote such claim, in any bankruptcy or insolvency proceeding, or in any action or proceeding for or growing out of the appointment of a receiver, or in any matter involving an assignment for the benefit of creditors.
John Dizard has a useful, and clearly written, piece on the lay of the land in this morning's FT. What puzzles me is why PDVSA, the national oil company, has not done a UK scheme of arrangement or a US prepack to exchange the bonds, instead of messing around with an exchange offer. But the entire situation is rather opaque.
Perhaps as a result of GM, I've been thinking about notice issues in connection with insolvency. Thus, I was a bit surprised to see these three notices, all related to Lehman cases pending in Hong Kong (and schemes of arrangement in those cases), which appeared in this morning's Financial Times.
Note that in the title the notice is addressed to the "Scheme Creditors," as "defined below." Yet below, we are told that Scheme Creditors are "as defined in the Scheme." So unless you are an insolvency fanatic – I plead guilty – and going to run down the documents and read them, this published notice has told you absolutely nothing.
They might as well run an add that says "A company is insolvent. You might be a creditor. Or maybe not. Good luck."
My take on the Second Circuit's opinion – which Levitin has also written about (and I agree with him that the used car analysis is a bit "off") – is over on Dealb%k. In short, I think that GM mostly has itself to blame for the inability to "discharge" these claims in its chapter 11 case. But the basic point that the federal Bankruptcy Code can override state law successor liability claims remains, despite what some state (and federal) courts have previously held.
The Second Circuit handed down its much-anticipated decision on the GM successor liability claims. Bottom line is that most, if not all, of the various claims against New GM are not barred by the Sale Order because of lack of procedural Due Process. That said, there's a lot more in the ruling. My thoughts below the break:
The following post comes to us from Professor Rasmussen at USC:
Nortel Bankruptcy Sets a Dangerous Precedent For the Future of Lending
Lenders are no fools. They care deeply about the promises they receive in return for the money they hand over to the borrower. And if a 2015 ruling in the long-running Nortel Networks bankruptcy case is allowed to stand, it could lead to more restrictive lending to borrowers in the future.
For decades, our commercial law has allowed enterprises to divvy up promises as they see fit. Companies often conduct business through multiple, related entities. This allows lenders to extend credit knowing they’ll receive repayment for their loans from particularly asset-rich subsidiaries, that are not on the hook for all of the debts of the business. This adroit use of the corporate structure allows borrowers to get funds at a lower cost and, in the extreme, can mean securing a loan or not — which can be the difference in a business being able to operate.
Until recently, a lender taking a promise from a subsidiary of a business could rest assured that its only other competition to the subsidiary’s assets would be the other creditors. A recent case, however, threatens to overturn this accepted wisdom and bring uncertainty to financing of large enterprises.
The Caesars examiner's report makes for interesting reading. Of particular interest for our readers might be its discussion of the role of the lawyers, namely those at Paul Weiss, who simultaneously represented the Caesars holding company, its operating subsidiary, and the holding company's private equity sponsor. As the report notes, it is not unusual for a law firm to simultaneously represent at a parent and a sub or a sponsor and a portfolio company. But the examiner's report argues that things change in one of the entities is insolvent because then the real party interest in that firm are the creditors, not the shareholders, and that means there is a real conflict of interest between the insolvent (or potentially insolvent) sub and the holding company (and private equity sponsor).
Although the examiner's report ultimately concludes that there's probably not much basis for finding liability against Paul Weiss (which might not have even know of the insolvency), something jumped out at me: the lurking conflict between Delaware corporate law and NY Rules of Professional Conduct.
Here's the problem. While the examiner's report is correct in describing creditors as the real party in interest in an insolvent company, that's not how Delaware corporate law treats things. In North American Catholic Educational Programming Foundation, Inc. v. Gheewala, the Delaware Supreme Court made very clear that even if a firm is insolvent, the duties of the directors still run to the firm and its shareholders, not to the creditors. (Were it otherwise, we'd have a lot of interesting litigation every time a firm got anywhere near insolvent, and risk averse directors would be well-counseled to file for bankruptcy the second insolvency appeared on the horizon.)
But let's assume that the examiner's report is correct that for the purposes of New York Rules of Professional Conduct there would be a conflict of interest such that the attorneys could not simultaneously represent both the parent and the insolvent sub. Presumably whatever attorneys would represent the sub would have to look to the interests of the creditors of the sub under NYRPC. How on earth would that work, when the sub's directors are responsible to the shareholder (i.e., the parent) under Delaware law? If the examiner's report's interpretation of NY RPC is correct, then I don't see how any NY barred lawyer can represent a Delaware corporation that might be insolvent. (Of course, the solution to all of this might be simply be that there is a violation of NY RPC, but it isn't really actionable by any body, and no bar committee is going to look at this too closely.)
After a delay of nearly 15 months, the Second Circuit this past Friday finally released its opinion in the Tribune Co. Fraudulent Conveyance Litigation. Briefly, the case concerned attempts by creditors to claw back payments to former shareholders in the Tribune Company's ill-fated LBO, which led to its 2008 bankruptcy. The theory of recovery was that buyout payments to former shareholders were made for less than reasonably equivalent value (to the company) while the company was insolvent (or thus rendered insolvent), so contemporaneous creditors could sue the former shareholders for return of the value they received as constructively fraudulent transfers. While the bankruptcy trustee (in this case, the Creditors Committee, by delegation) had the power to pursue these claims (under section 544(b)), it chose not to, most likely because section 546(e) prohibited it from doing so. But when the two-year statute of limitations for pursuing those actions passed, the claims supposedly reverted to the individual creditors (more on this below), who took up those claims with the explicit permission of the bankruptcy court. Fast-forward to last week ... I am not surprised that the Second Circuit stuck to its historically broad construction of the "settlement payment" safe harbor in section 546(e) and held that state law fraudulent conveyance actions by creditors are barred by that provision just as a similar action by a "trustee" would be. More interesting, in my view, is the "why are we even talking about this" discussion of whether those creditors had any right to be pursuing those claims in the first place.
The primary objection being made by those opposed to this amendment is that Congress needs to hold extensive hearings. But this is just a correction to a recent misinterpretation of the statute – not a wholesale revision of the Trust Indenture Act.
That's just not right. This isn't just a "clarifying amendment". The proposed amendment neuters the Trust Indenture Act as a protection for bondholders.
So a brazen attempt to undermine the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 has failed, but you can expect the proponents will try again.
There is no way that Congress should be thinking about changing anything in the TIA without comprehensively studying our entire corporate reorganization system. The TIA intentionally makes it hard to restructure debt outside of bankruptcy. It was passed at the same time that corporate bankruptcy was federalized. The two systems are part of the same package, and can't be considered in isolation.
So if we think that the TIA needs to be "updated," let's discuss that in the proper context of the entire corporate restructuring system. But sneaking in amendments to unrelated bills is not how any responsible member of Congress should be proceeding on this issue.
As expected, as the number of consumers filing bankruptcy has continued to decrease, the revenue of the consumer bankruptcy debtor and creditor bar has been hit hard. Over the past several years billable hours of business bankruptcy (including insolvency, workout or reorganization) lawyers have been dropping and many mid-level partners at large firms are looking for work in related or unrelated specialties.
We would expect consumer bankruptcy work to increase when:
The future is harder to call for the business bankruptcy field. Everyone expects the number of business failures and loan defaults to increase when interest rates tick up and those businesses that are surviving only because of the low rates cannot service their debts or find alternative financing. Even though the economy had not been vibrant, with the exception of specific industries such as coal or oil defaults are low.
The challenge is to predict to what extent law work in this area is down because of structural and legislative changes. For example, the shift from traditional financial institution lenders to “Loan to Own” lenders has reduced the amount of law work related to default and/or restructure on both the debtor and the creditor side. Partly related to that change, the shift from chapter 11 reorganizations to “chapter” 363 sales has significantly reduced bankruptcy court work. One of the factors in the shift to 363 sales rather than true reorganizations was the legislative changes to Article 9 in all fifty states. When the ALI –ULI drafting committee made it much easier to take and enforce in bankruptcy court a security interest in just about every conceivable type of asset they reduced the reorganization leverage.
What percentage of the drop off in work involving defaults, workouts and restructure is related to these factors will determine to what extent the work will grow when defaults rise.
Some thoughts on the 3d Circuit's recent opinion in LifeCare, which I suspect will lead to even more 363 sales, over at Dealb%k.
The quest for yield and its effect on the future of chapter 11 cases, over at Dealb%k.
So I've been off the grid for a few weeks, and of course after months of little to talk about, the world gave us a bounty of stories about financial distress, and related topics, each of which would merit its own post. But I'm going to hit them quickly to get caught up again this holiday weekend:
That might generate some comments this weekend.
And the business model that will likely leave them unable to pay students, even if the students win in their ongoing litigation, over at Dealb%k.
Chapter 11's ability to empower true reorganization has received much criticism of late in light of an increasingly held assumption that most Chapter 11 cases end in a 363 sale of the debtor's assets. Around this time last year, the American Bankruptcy Institute and the University of Illinois College of Law co-hosted a symposium dedicated to discussing secured creditors’ rights and role in modern Chapter 11. Papers from the symposium (including by Slips contributors) very recently became available here.
I was lucky enough to moderate a couple of the symposium panels. As I was listening to the discussion, I noticed that what I was hearing about secured creditors and 363 sales did not match what I had observed in my study of how religious organizations (mainly smaller churches) currently use Chapter 11. To accompany the release of the symposium papers, I wrote a short piece describing how secured creditors influenced religious organizations' Chapter 11 cases in ways that did not lead to widespread sales, but rather, plans and settlements.
Over at Dealb%k, I have a new column up about Colt's rather aggressive dual-track exchange offer and prepack.
In short, it involves very little creditor input. Perhaps part of a larger trend of aggressive use of chapter 11 by private equity backed debtors?
And no, I have no idea if Robert Culp is holding a Colt firearm that that picture ... but he looks kind of cool, doesn't he?
The ABI has spent thousands of hours on its Chapter 11 Commission Report; the National Bankruptcy Conference is hard at work on its "Rethinking Chapter 11" project. Underlying these and other such efforts is an overwhelming frustration with the failure of Chapter 11, under current circumstances to empower true reorganization. Hard to believe but it was not always this way. During the first decade or two of the Bankruptcy Code it seemed to be working pretty well; in fact many courts were unwilling to consider quick sales of the entire business. Many large cases resulted in a confirmed reorganization plan although some led to further chapter 11 efforts or failure; the results in smaller or medium-sized cases were more uneven with a healthy percentage being dismissed or converted to Chapter 7. There was almost no discussion of Section 363 at the Ten Year Retrospective on Chapter 11 in Williamsburg and there was little commentary on its use. Indeed, the 1997 report of the Bankruptcy Review Commission did not focus on this issue.
Beginning sometime between the Code's tenth and twenty-fifth birthdays the tide shifted; not only did most courts back off from their legal position that Chapter 11 was for reorganization and that any sale of the entire business needed to be done within a Plan, but the vast majority of cases seemed to shift to quick 363 sales to a suitor that was identified before the filing with an auction possible if there were competing bidders.
Although I keep swearing off the topic, I've written something about chapter 11 professional fees. Again. Over at Dealb%k.
I just finished discussing the “random walk” theory in my Corporate Finance class, so I thought I would close out my stint on Credit Slips with some “random thoughts” on reform.
First, two expressions of sincere gratitude: I want to thank Bob Lawless and everyone at Credit Slips for the opportunity to blog about reform these past two weeks. It has been great fun. I also would like to thank the many practitioners, judges, financial advisors, academics, and industry groups who participated in the ABI Commission reform study process. Everyone made a meaningful contribution to the project.
Much is being made of American Airlines' "bold" decision to avoid hedging its fuel costs.
I fully believe that corporations engage in way too much hedging, mostly to the benefit of big financial institutions. But let's be clear, a just out of bankruptcy counterparty is not going to be doing a lot of swaps deals anyway.
Anyone who has ever litigated a valuation issue knows that valuation is more art than science. Experts often arrive at widely divergent valuations. Yet, these valuations are of the same company, for the same time period, based on the same data, and often invoke the same model. How then can the valuations be so different and, more importantly, which expert is right? Valuations of course can vary for a number of reasons, including different assumptions and inputs, and sometimes because of the methodology itself. But as one of my very astute students in Corporate Finance recently pointed out, valuations also likely differ because of the legal position (he actually used the term "self-interest") of the party employing the expert and offering the particular valuation into evidence.
People (and institutions) like rules that give them a competitive edge. You need only to look at the recent headlines and the media coverage of “Deflate Gate” to understand this basic concept. Reportedly, Tom Brady, Peyton Manning, and other quarterbacks lobbied the NFL to allow each team to supply its own set of footballs for use by that team’s quarterback during games. Note—I am not suggesting ill motive on the part of either Brady or Manning (or the others). Although I never played quarterback, I can understand a quarterback’s desire to select personally his own game-day equipment.
How does any of this relate to chapter 11 reform? To answer that question, ask yourself a different one: Do you like how chapter 11 currently resolves your client’s key issues in most instances? If you answered “yes,” you likely see no reason for reform. If you answered “no,” you likely would favor reform, but perhaps only those aspects of reform beneficial to your client. Therein lies the ever-present dilemma for policymakers: implementing the best policy for the overall federal bankruptcy system in the midst of so much noise.
Can a company really melt? Putting aside a business with a perishable product or inventory, does management really wake up one morning and say, “Wow, if we do not sell this company in 30 days or less, we will lose significant value for our stakeholders.” I highly doubt it. Rather, I think a company “melts” because management leaves the freezer door open too long, or perhaps a particular stakeholder has its foot in the door. (For a thoughtful article on the melting ice cube issue, see here.)
If the Code simply did not permit expedited sales, what would happen? Could it be that the possibility of an expedited sale with all of the bells and whistles of a confirmed plan enables management and senior creditors either to delay the chapter 11 filing or to manufacture urgency? From my perspective, this question is the central difficulty with section 363 going concern sales. A company should be able to reorganize through a value-maximizing sale in chapter 11. But those sales should not include quick fire sales that offer little opportunity for a robust auction or the need to use chapter 11 tools to enhance value in that auction. Chapter 7 is already well suited for such fire sales.
I'm totally with this guy – Hershey's move to keep British Cadbury's products out of the US is un-American. Anyone who has tasted the British version of Cadbury's knows that it's a far superior product.
Well look at the Times article about this scandal: it seems that the agreement between Hershey's and Cadbury, and Hershey's rather aggressive enforcement of the same, is apt to drive a few small businesses into bankruptcy.
That really seems un-American.
(Ok cynics, have at it.)
It may surprise some, but approximately 90% of all chapter 11 debtors have less than $10 million in assets or liabilities, less than $10 million in annual revenues, and 50 or fewer employees (see data on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the ABI Commission Report, here). These companies are the heart of chapter 11. Nevertheless, most of the media and caselaw coverage discusses only the megacases—e.g., Caesars, American Airlines, Tribune Company, etc.—representing approximately 2-3% of chapter 11 debtors. It is time to change the focus of the conversation.
When a small business closes its doors, an entire community feels the impact. Consider the following description of the ripple effects of the closing of a small mine in Lincoln County, Montana:
In addition to the workers and families directly impacted by the loss of jobs, the ripple effects of the loss of that income will impact local businesses at every level. Restaurants, stores and other shops depend upon local consumers to keep themselves afloat, the dollars that are paid to those employees find their way into the hands of a number of additional places, keeping a small local economy alive. (Full story here.)
Similar stories occur most everyday in towns across America (see, e.g., here).
The general counsel of a financially distressed company calls you. She of course clearly states that her company does not need to file a chapter 11 case, but she is curious to understand how a chapter 11 case might work for her company. Specifically, she wants to know: Can the company continue to use intellectual property it licenses and has integrated into its business operations? Will some or all of the company’s existing shareholders be able to retain their ownership if they contribute to the company’s reorganization? If the company decides to pursue a sale, can the company sell its assets free and clear of all claims? Will she and the company’s other executives be released from any alleged liability if the company confirms a plan of reorganization? What if the company reorganizes through a going concern sale instead?
All very astute questions, to which you will likely have to answer, “it depends.” It depends primarily on where the company files its chapter 11 case. These and other key issues in chapter 11 are subject to splits in the case law that create uncertainty and increase costs. The splits require companies (and their creditors) to perform extensive jurisdictional analyses of issues likely to be important in any chapter 11 case. Not surprisingly, one jurisdiction may be favorable on one issue, with another jurisdiction more favorable (or silent) on a different, equally critical issue.
In his State of the Union speech on Tuesday, President Obama talked a lot about job creation. I am all for growing the economy and creating more U.S. jobs, but I also am for saving jobs and keeping people employed at U.S. companies, even if those companies fall upon hard financial times. Strikingly, approximately 18,500 people lost their jobs when Hostess closed its doors; 34,000 people lost their jobs when Circuit City suffered the same fate; and over 9,900 people were let go as a result of four casinos in Atlantic City closing in the past twelve months.
It is undeniable that chapter 11 changes people’s lives. It can save an employee’s job, continue a customer relationship for a vendor, and preserve a tenant for a landlord. It also can, however, devastate all of these relationships in what feels like a nanosecond—relationships that many people rely on to support their families or their own business operations. As I suggested in an earlier post, I believe that the human face of chapter 11 often gets lost in all of the noise concerning the rate of return to creditors, disputes among institutional creditors, and whether a company should be sold quickly, or at all, through the chapter 11 process.
In the past two months, four retailers have filed bankruptcy cases. RadioShack is rumored to be preparing a chapter 11 filing, and other retailers certainly appear to be struggling (see Stephen Lubben’s post here). But if you were counseling any of these retailers, would you recommend a chapter 11 filing? Okay, put aside the professional fees you might earn—would filing really be in the best interests of your retail client? (For a discussion of fees and costs in chapter 11, see Part IV.A.8 of the ABI Commission Report.)
Consider this: from 2006-2013, the number of retailers liquidating in chapter 11 increased significantly. Although no data are perfect, the various data we have on chapter 11 filings are quite telling. For example, according to the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research database, during 2006-2013, 41.2% of large public retailers (excluding eating and drinking places) emerged from chapter 11 and 58.8% liquidated while, during 1980-2005, 60.5% of large public retailers emerged from chapter 11 and only 39.5% liquidated. Likewise, a quick look at the New Generations Public and Major Private Companies database suggests a similar trend for 2006-2013: approximately 62% of retail cases in the database ended in a liquidation (36 of 58). A chapter 11 filing has, quite literally, become a “bet the company” decision for retailers.
For those of you who are not familiar with my scholarship, I am fairly conservative in my approach, and I strive to remain objective in my analysis and balanced in my proposals. I believe that most companies try to get it right, I respect markets, and I do not think that financial institutions and private funds are evil. In fact, some of my scholarship suggests that private funds may actually add value to matters (see example here). I mention these things only to help you understand the lens through which I analyze corporate governance and restructuring issues, including the chapter 11 reform topics that will be the focus of my posts over the next several days.
Based on my research and my ten-plus years in private practice, chapter 11 is not just a value maximization and distribution scheme. It is much more. I was in Judge Bodoh’s courtroom during the LTV Steel cases when hundreds of steelworks packed the courthouse during hearings. I was in Judge Wedoff’s courtroom during the United Airlines cases when pilots and flight attendants would often be on hand. And I worked on several asbestos cases (see, e.g., here and here), which affected not only the livelihoods of thousands of people, but also the health and well-being of several thousand more. In each of these cases, and many others I worked on, the people—not the continuation of some fictitious legal entity or a particular creditor group’s return on its investment—were at the heart of the process. (For another example of this principle, see here.)
It's turning into a wild week in Chapter 11 with the dueling bankruptcy petitions for Caesar's Entertainment. On Monday, an involuntary petition was filed in Delaware against Caesar's by some of its Second Lien noteholders. Today, Caesar's filed a voluntary petition in the Northern District of Illinois. It's not the year of the Four Emperors yet, but it is the year of the Two Caesar's petitions.
So what's going on? Here's the story, at least as I've been able to figure out so far. It's a sordid and quite fascinating tale of private-equity vs. hedge funds grappling in an age-old bankruptcy dance: the squeeze play.
In an earlier post, I claimed that Thomas Jefferson School of Law’s recent debt restructuring was the rational response to its recent financial difficulties. I closed that post by suggesting that bankruptcy was not a viable option for Thomas Jefferson’s creditors because of U.S. Department of Education (“E.D.”) regulations. Those regulations provide that a voluntarily bankruptcy filing terminates an institution’s eligibility to participate in Title IV loan programs (e.g., Stafford, Perkins and Plus loans). As a result, law schools and their creditors ordinarily share “overwhelming incentives . . . in avoiding bankruptcy”. See Marblegate Asset Mgmt. v. Education Mgmt. Corp., 2014 WL 7399041,*11. (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2014).
A brief discussion of those regulations and their implications follows after the jump.
On Friday November 7, 2014, Judge Rhodes confirmed the City of Detroit's plan of adjustment. As previously noted, this judicial act permits the release of debt and clears the way for the City to forge ahead, but the future of Detroit is in the hands of many others. Although a fuller written decision is expected, the court's oral ruling already hints strongly at new bankruptcy doctrine. Two examples: unfair discrimination and professional fees.
Almost two weeks ago now, the Delaware Supreme Court handed down its decision over J.P. Morgan's mistaken termination statement in the General Motors bankruptcy. (Note to Google Chrome users like me -- the link may not work; try a different web browser.) I think they got it right, but to understand why, one obviously needs to know the facts. Melissa Jacoby has blogged about the case (especially) here and here. As Melissa explains in more detail in the former post, the case revolves a mistaken Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) filing by JPMorgan Chase.
To really stylize the facts, there were two loans from JPMorgan Chase to General Motors. Let's call them Loan A and Loan B. Both loans were secured. Loan A was being paid off. Acting on behalf of JPMorgan Chase, lawyers for General Motors were instructed to file a termination statement in the UCC records. Because of a slip-up in the paperwork, termination statements were filed for both Loan A and Loan B. At the time General Motors entered bankruptcy, Loan B was still outstanding in the amount of $1.5 billion, meaning that if the termination statement is effective JPMorgan Chase would be unsecured in the General Motors bankruptcy.
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