Over at Dealb%k. (BTW, I don't pick the pictures).
Thanks a tweet to the sharp-eyed Drew Dawson at the University of Miami, I saw this article in Politico that among the surprises in Trump's budget is an increase in bankruptcy filing fees (see item 5). Well, this seemed important to those of us in the bankruptcy world so I thought I would check it out. It proved surprisingly more difficult in this day and age than one would think to get a PDF copy of the Trump budget outline, but I finally found one. I am not sure the characterization of an increase in "bankruptcy filing fees" is entirely accurate.
Above is a screenshot from p. 30 of the document (clicking on it should bring up a full-sized image in a popup window). Keep in mind this is an outline of the underlying budget document. What appears to be proposed in an increase in the quarterly U.S. Trustee fee for chapter 11 filers and not a general increase in all bankruptcy filing fees or even the chapter 11 filing fee. Of course, the paragraph does characterize it as an increase in bankruptcy filing fees so maybe there is such a broad increase in the budget itself.
Does anybody know for certain?
This is a joint post by Mitu Gulati and Mark Weidemaier.
Scotland voted 62% in favor of remaining in the EU in last June's Brexit vote. Now, with nationalism on the rise in Britain, Scotland has begun to rethink the decision to stay in the UK. Fears of a so-called "hard exit," in which Britain foregoes easy access to the common market, have Scottish leaders like Nicola Sturgeon demanding another referendum on Scottish independence. Which has us wondering: What happens to the (rather large) pile of UK debt if one of its members decides to exit?
It seems like voters in Scotland ought to care about the answer, if given another chance to vote on UK membership. More broadly, one would think voters would want some idea how the UK's assets and liabilities would be divvied up. Things like the public debt, the crown jewels, pension obligations to veterans, the nuclear arsenal, Balmoral castle, and so on. The UK has a lot of stuff. How should it be divided?
The American Bankruptcy Institute announced this morning that it has convened a commission to study and propose reforms of the US consumer bankruptcy system. In light of the success of ABI's Chapter 11 commission, we can expect big things from this commission on Chapters 7 and 13. Some major names in consumer bankruptcy are among the 15 members of the commission, and Credit Slips is well represented, with Bob Lawless as Reporter and Katie Porter on the membership roster, along with one more super-prominent academic, professor-cum-judge-cum-professor Bruce Markell, now of Northwestern. I wish the commission had consulted Bob about its name. He would have pointed to his empirical work on small business debtors to suggest that this be called a personal bankruptcy commission, rather than consumer, but perhaps the inclusion of a good deal of small business debtors and business-related debts is taken as a given. Anyway, best wishes to the commission--we'll eagerly await its first reports and calls for comments!
This is a joint post by Mark Weidemaier and Mitu Gulati.
We have talked before about the possibility that Venezuelan state-owned oil company PDVSA will need to restructure. With oil prices still low, the early-2017 gloom about the company's economic prospects hasn't lifted. True, the company and its sovereign owner have managed to stave off default for a while now; perhaps this can continue. But restructuring is a real possibility. In our international debt finance class this year, we have been asking students to think about how a restructuring might work.
For PDVSA the options basically come down to bankruptcy and the use of exit consents. We talked about the latter option--basically a voluntary exchange offer in which participating bondholders also vote to eliminate contractual protections in the old bonds, making them less attractive to hold--in an earlier post. For many corporations, bankruptcy would be the preferred option, if only to benefit from the automatic stay of creditor collection efforts. But PDVSA's bankruptcy options are limited. It is a Venezuelan company, and Venezuelan bankruptcy law is not ideal for debtors seeking to restructure. Plus, in order to be worth anything, a Venezuelan bankruptcy proceeding would need to be recognized in the United States, likely under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. It isn't clear that a Venezuelan proceeding would merit such recognition. Nor is it clear that PDVSA meets eligibility requirements under US bankruptcy law. Still, bankruptcy offers the only mechanism for imposing restructuring terms on dissenting creditors, and that is what PDVSA most needs (with regard to its bond debt, anyway).
This is a joint post by Mitu Gulati and Mark Weidemaier.
Odds seem to be against a Marine Le Pen victory in the French presidential election, though a victory by Emmanuel Macron is hardly assured. And there continues to be chatter about redenomination risk in Europe, to the point that, according to a recent Deutsche Bank estimate, even short-term German bonds were factoring in a 5% risk of redenomination. Last week, in our class on international debt finance, we discussed the so-called Gold Clause cases from the 1930s. Though ancient history in some respects, the cases offer important lessons for some of the debates regarding redenomination risk. First, though, some background.
Many of us on Credit Slips have been part of the Consumer Bankruptcy Project (CBP), a long-term research project studying people who file chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcy. Several years ago, some of us blogged about the writings from the last CBP iteration in 2007. In 2013, the CBP was relaunched as an ongoing data collection effort. The CBP’s current co-investigators – myself, Bob Lawless, Katie Porter, and Debb Thorne – recently posted “No Money Down” Bankruptcy, the first article analyzing data from the Current CBP (data from 2013-2015), combined with 2007 CPB data. The article focuses on the timing of when debtors are required to pay their bankruptcy attorneys to report on the increasingly prevalent phenomenon of debtors paying nothing in attorneys’ fees before filing chapter 13.
This nationwide phenomenon raises questions about how people are accessing bankruptcy and the extent of the benefits they receive from the system. The phenomenon also explains some prior findings about the intersection of race and bankruptcy filings. And it adds to our knowledge about regional disparities in the percentage of people who file chapter 7 versus chapter 13 bankruptcies.
This is a joint post by Mitu Gulati and Mark Weidemaier
March 2 was the hundredth anniversary of the Jones Act, which gave United States citizenship to many inhabitants of Puerto Rico. An act of benevolence? Hardly. The U.S. needed soldiers. The infamous insular cases ensured that, while tens of thousands from Puerto Rico could fight in the U.S. military, they would remain "foreign in a domestic sense."
Today, Puerto Rico and its municipalities are mired in debt--over $100 billion counting pension obligations. A bizarre exception to the bankruptcy laws prevented it from restructuring much of this debt, although no one seems to know exactly why the exception exists (aside, perhaps, from the fact that Puerto Rico has no representation in Congress).
There's a great new paper available on out-of-court restructuring and the Trust Indenture Act. The New Bond Workouts is up on SSRN. From the abstract it sounds pretty darn amazing—a new, empirically based analysis of bond restructurings that rediscovers a long-forgotten intercreditor duty of good faith:
The Second Circuit currently has a pending case (Anderson v. Credit One Bank, No. 16-2496) that raises the question of whether an alleged violation of the bankruptcy discharge injunction is subject to a predispute arbitration agreement. Professors Ralph Brubaker and Bruce Markell have joined me on an amicus brief explaining why the answer has to be "no." You can download the brief from SSRN. (UPDATE 3/3: The link was broken but should be fixed now.)
Bankruptcy specialists know the "discharge" means the forgiveness of prebankruptcy debts. The "discharge injunction" comes from section 524 of the Bankruptcy Code, which states that the entry of a discharge shall operate as an injunction against attempts to collect prebankruptcy debts. Indeed, one of the things the brief tries to make clear is that the "discharge" and "discharge injunction" are different concepts. Historically, filing bankruptcy gave rise to a discharge, but there was no enforcement of that discharge in the federal court that issued it. Rather, the debtor could plead the discharge as an affirmative defense in a state-court collection action.
On March 1, 2016, Credit Slips commenced a virtual symposium on Puerto Rico's financial crisis. Where do things stand today, a year later? And what governance lessons can be learned from municipal bankruptcy cases like Detroit for the public debt problems of tomorrow? Thanks to a fortuitously timed conference at Brooklyn Law School, a subset of Slipsters will be considering these very questions on Friday March 3, 2017. Check out the agenda and join us in Brooklyn - register here today.
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